PUBLIC AGENCIES AS LOBBYISTS
Jody Freeman and J.R. DeShazo**
I. INTRODUCTION
Though Congress often delegates many tasks to public agencies, each agency can usually
claim to have a primary mandate, which is reflected in its organic or enabling legislation. So, for
example, one could fairly say that the National Highway Transportation and Safety
Administration’s primary mandate is “highway safety,” the Department of Transportation’s is
“infrastructure development,” and the Food and Drug Administration’s is “public health
protection.” Frequently, however, Congress imposes additional or secondary mandates on an
implementing agency. Secondary mandates can be substantive or procedural: they may limit the
discretion of the lead agency, or impose obligations to consider additional factors, perform a
particular analysis, or consult with specific players. Frequently, Congress imposes these
mandates indirectly, by passing entirely separate statutes unrelated to the agency’s original
enabling act.1 Thus, for example, Congress might create the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in
1920 and charge it with the authority to license hydropower production,2 and at a later time pass
a series of environmental statutes with which the agency (now the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission),3 in theory, must also comply. In this sense, Congress can create the potential for
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1
Many statutes do not impose a mandate on a particular agency, but rather impose burdens on all agencies equally,
providing they engage in a “triggering” activity. See e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act, 1969 which, per §
102(2)(C), requires all federal agencies to produce environmental impact statements for major federal projects with
a significant impact on the environment and the Endangered Species Act, 1973, which, per §7, requires all federal
agencies to “consult” with the Department of Interior (or for marine species the Department of Commerce) to ensure
that federal agency action is not likely to jeopardize the survival of a listed species.
2
Prior to the passage of the FPA, the Secretaries of War, Agriculture and Interior each had authority to issue
licenses for hydroelectric projects on lands under their respective jurisdiction, an approach that led to confusion and
inefficiency. The Act centralized authority in a single agency by creating a commission consisting of the three
Secretaries. The Commission was reorganized in 1930 to consist of five persons independent of the three
Secretaries. See Act of June 23, 1930 ch. 572, 46 Stat. 797.
3
The FPC was reorganized by Congress into the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1977. See 42
U.S.C. §7171 (1977).
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inter-statutory conflicts, meaning that Congress creates a situation in which the agency must
balance multiple and potentially competing obligations arising from different statutes usually
passed at different times by different enacting majorities.
Agencies frequently resolve such inter-statutory conflicts by prioritizing their primary
mission and letting their secondary obligations fall by the wayside. Consider the historical
reluctance of licensing and development agencies to comply with environmental mandates in the
early years of environmental legislation. Federal agencies such as the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Transportation and the FERC
famously resisted complying with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),4 the Clean
Water Act (CWA),5 the Endangered Species Act,6 and a host of other environmental laws when
they were first passed in the late sixties and seventies.7 This resistance is problematic, of course:
it results in under-implementation of some congressional goals in favor of others. And while it
arises frequently in the environmental context, we imagine that it occurs in other settings as well.
In this article, we explore this problem of agency reluctance in the face of multiple
mandates. Specifically, we explain how and why agencies might resist secondary mandates,
which typically—though not always—come in the form of obligations imposed in separate
statutes passed after Congress delegates the agency’s primary mission in its enabling law.8
Relying on an illustrative study of FERC’s resistance to environmental legislation, we explain
the political and economic forces that operate to encourage agency reluctance: congressional
committees that reward an agency’s pursuit of its primary mission to the exclusion of its
obligations under other statutes; executive oversight that fails to force agency compliance with
multiple and potentially conflicting obligations arising in different statutes; interest group
pressure that supports the agency’s primary mission but not its secondary ones; and aspects of
agency culture and organization that create obstacles to full compliance with all mandates.
But our story, at bottom, is one of agency reluctance overcome. We argue that agencies
can be prompted to take their secondary missions more seriously when Congress enhances the
power of other agencies, with relevant expertise and interests derived from their own statutory
mandates, to lobby them.9 In our example, Congress does this in a particular way, namely by
4
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See DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN & JEANNE NIENABER, CAN ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE? (1979) (documenting the
Army Corps of Eingineers’ resistance to modifying its historical mission of building large water-resource
development projects in light of the environmental imperatives of NEPA); SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING
BEAURACRACIES THINK (1984) (providing a case study of how NEPA was implemented and resisted in the Forest
Service and Army Corps of Engineers); JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL C. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE
TERRAIN, (2D ED. 1996) (explaining that agency’s may not easily integrate the functions and purposes of new
legislation even when it accords with their own original mission).
8
Congress can create intra-statutory conflicts by giving an agency conflicting duties at the outset, and then
expecting the agency to make difficult trade-offs. Indeed, one can argue that the Federal Power Act of 1920
originally charged FERC with responsibility to license hydropower and to protect non-power values. Still, our study
emphasizes the secondary mandates that came later in the form of environmental laws.
9
We use this term purposely, to convey the idea that agencies might seek to influence each other in order to achieve
a desired outcome, much the same as private lobbyists might try to pressure legislators and bureaucrats to achieve
5
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amending the agency’s enabling law. In so doing, Congress transforms an inter-statute conflict
that the agency can ignore, into an intra-statute one that it cannot.10
We base our argument on an empirical study of FERC’s licensing decisions from 19831998. The period covers the years immediately prior to, and following, the passage in 1986 of
the Electrical Consumer’s Protection Act (ECPA). What difference did this legislation make? It
specifically strengthened the ability of resource management agencies to influence FERC in the
hydropower licensing process. ECPA solidified and enhanced the leverage of these agencies,
which served as a mechanism for forcing FERC to pay attention to the environmental concerns it
had long ignored.
Indeed, ECPA requires FERC to do many of the things that it was in theory already
obligated to do under both the Federal Power Act (FPA) and existing environmental laws, but
didn’t. For example, ECPA explicitly requires that FERC consult federal and state fish and
wildlife agencies in order to assess, and then mitigate, the adverse environmental impact of
proposed dams. 11 FERC was already obligated to do this pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act (FWCA), yet did so rather half-heartedly at best.12 To take another example,
ECPA explicitly requires FERC to give “equal consideration” in its licensing decisions to nonpower values, such as the protection of fish and wildlife resources. Though ECPA made this
requirement explicit, FERC was at least arguably bound to do this already, under the FPA as it

their desired legislative or administrative ends. Of course the two are different. Yet, while sister agencies may not
use all of the same means of exerting influence as private lobbyists (e.g., campaign contributions), they certainly use
some of the same means (e.g., providing useful information; threatening litigation; threatening to go over the head of
the agency to members of Congress or higher ups in the White House). In response to some readers who have
flinched at our use of the term to describe government activity, we should clarify that we do not mean to suggest that
the activity is somehow perjorative. Nor do we mean to describe agencies as lobbyists before Congress. Rather, we
focus on the role that agencies play in lobbying their sister agencies for particular outcomes.
10
We are quick to note that the form Congress uses to enhance inter-agency lobbying need not be the one we
observe—that is, Congress could accomplish the same thing without amending the enabling law itself—yet,
amending the agency’s enabling statute may prove optimal for a variety of reasons. See infra note and
accompanying text.
11
All dams have a significant impact on the environment, by altering flow rates and water quality. Inadequate
stream flow due to impounded water can destroy fish habitat and spawning areas, and can adversely affect upstream
and downstream passage. For example, dams in the Pacific Northwest have had a devastating impact on anadromous
fish runs (e.g., Chinook, coho and sockeye salmon) because these fish use the Columbia River and its tributaries to
migrate to the Pacific Ocean, where they mature and then return upstream to spawn. Dams interfere with fish
migration in both directions. Without fish ladders and other forms of assistance, adult fish may not survive the
upstream migration. Similarly, juvenile fish migrating downstream may be killed when passing through turbines, or
may abandon migration prematurely due to the challenges of passing around the dam or because of insufficient
stream flow (due to impounded water). Dams also adversely affect habitat by increasing water temperatures,
reducing oxygen levels, contributing to erosion and degrading water quality. See Sarah C. Richardson, Note, The
Changing Political Landscape of Hydropower Project Relicensing 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 499,
508 (2000); Melissa Powell, Note, A Case Study for Stakeholders: An Alternative to Traditional Hydrolectric
Relicensing 18 ENERGY L. J. 405, 406 (1997). The environmental conditions imposed on dam licensees can help to
ameliorate these effects. Conditions can include requirements for minimum stream flows, bank enhancements to
control erosion, and limitations on effluent to maintain water quality.
12
See 16 U.S.C. 661 et seq.
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had been construed by courts13 and pursuant to the FWCA as it had been amended by Congress.
Yet FERC had, for a variety of reasons, long resisted doing so.14
ECPA also reinforced the need for FERC to comply with a suite of environmental
statutes passed half a century after the FPA, which FERC had either ignored or adhered to only
minimally. These include the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires
federal agencies to produce environmental impact statements for proposed major actions that
would significantly affect the environment, and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which
requires federal agencies to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine
Fisheries Service to ensure dams will not jeopardize endangered species.15 At least until the mid13

Section 10(a) of the FPA of 1920 requires FERC to grant licenses on the determination that the project will be
“best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit
of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other
beneficial public uses including recreational purposes….” It seems unlikely, given the political context of the time
that Congress intended, even with this broad “public interest” standard, that nonpower values would receive equal
consideration along with development values.
14
In 1934, Congress passed the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act requiring in § 3(b) that the federal government
consult the Bureau of Fisheries prior to the construction of any public or private dam, and to make “due and
adequate provision, if economically practicable” for the mitigation of fish life to the upper waters of the dam via fish
passage facilities such as fish ladders. See Fish and Wildlife coordination Act, March 10, 1934, Ch. 55, 48 Stat. 401,
16 U.S.C.§§661 to 666c (S.2529; P.L. 73-121). The Act was amended four times between 1934 and 1965. Each time
Congress required the government to do more to consider the impact of hydropower on fish and wildlife, and each
time Congress strengthened the hand of other agencies in the dam licensing process. In 1948, Congress specifically
required in §5(a) that in managing facilities on a particular stretch of the Mississippi River, federal government
agencies are “hereby directed to give full consideration and recognition to the needs of fish and other wildlife
resources.” See June 19, 1948, Ch. 528, 62 Stat. 497, 16 U.S.C. §665a (H.R. 2721; P.L. 80-697). And in 1958
Congress explicitly amended the Act for the purpose of ensuring that, “wildlife conservation shall receive equal
consideration and be coordinated with other features of water-resource development.” See § 2. Congress required
that permitting agencies consult with state and federal wildlife agencies “with a view to the conservation of wildlife
resources by preventing loss of and damages to them” in connection with water development. See §2a, August 12,
1958, P.L. 85-624, 72 Stat.563, 16 U.S.C. §661 to 664 (H.R.13138). In addition, the Pacific Northwest Power
Planning and Conservation Act applies specifically to the Columbia River system and imposes substantive rather
than procedural obligations. It requires federal agencies responsible for managing hydropower projects on the
Columbia system to, among other things, “adequately protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife…in a manner
that provides equitable treatment for such fish and wildlife with the other purposes for which such system and
facilities are managed…” 16 U.S.C.§839b(h)(11)(A)(i).
15
See e.g., The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 1968, § 7(a) which applies specifically to FERC, limiting the agency’s
authority to license or grant an exemption to any project that is on or directly affects a river designated or proposed
as part of the national system, as determined the Secretaries of Interior or Agriculture. WSRA currently protects
over 11,000 miles of 158 rivers. WSRA "study rivers" are designated by the Secretary of Interior or Agriculture as
under consideration for inclusion in the national system. FERC is barred from issuing hydropower licenses for 3years after a river is designated "study river," and for additional 3-years after completion of Presidential reports
required by study program. Rivers may ultimately become part of the national system by one of two routes: through
an act of Congress (federally funded), or by State designation (State funded). A proposed project need not adversely
affect a designated river or study river to fall under the WSRA § 7(a) license prohibition; it need only be found to
"directly affect" a designated or proposed river within the national system. WSRA § 7(a) does not, however,
"preclude licensing of, or assistance to, developments below or above a wild, scenic or recreational river area or on
any stream tributary thereto which will not invade the area or unreasonably diminish [its] scenic, recreational, and
fish and wildlife values." See also, the Clean Water Act (1972) § 401, which, unlike WSRA generally applies to all
federal agencies. Under §401, projects that require a federal permit or license must first receive state certification
See also, The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, § 106 also generally applies to all federal agencies,
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1980s, FERC largely disregarded these laws, along with the FWCA, the CWA, the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA), and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), prioritizing
instead its original pro-power and, therefore, pro-licensing mission.16 By reinforcing these
mandates, ECPA sought to halt FERC’s systematic bias against environmental values.
ECPA not only reiterated FERC’s obligations, however, it added to them.17 For example,
to the extent that FERC did consider non-power values in licensing decisions, it had always
required license applicants themselves to consult with state and federal resource agencies before
submitting their applications to FERC. ECPA altered this, subtly but importantly, by placing the
burden of such consultation directly on the FERC.18 Second, ECPA required, for the first time,
that FERC establish a dispute resolution process to mediate its disagreements with other
agencies.19 Third, the statute demanded that FERC provide an explanation whenever it chose not
implement the recommendations of other agencies, something it had not been directly obligated
to do before.20 And finally, ECPA forced FERC to engage in monitoring to ensure that dam
operators complied with any environmental conditions, something that had been done only rather
ineffectively in the past.21 While all of these impositions might be viewed as procedural, they
were clearly intended to have a substantive effect.22
including FERC. Prior to licensing any project, the federal agency must assess the effects of its licensing on historic
properties and provide the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation with a reasonable opportunity to comment.
The Advisory Council's regulations implementing § 106 provide for agreements among federal agencies, State
Historic Preservation Officers, and the Advisory Council as a means of assessing effects on historic properties and
affording the Advisory Council its opportunity to comment. If the proposed action involves a large or complex
project, or includes a class of undertakings that would otherwise require numerous individual requests for
comments, a Programmatic Agreement (PA) may be used. A PA that addresses the effects of a hydroelectric project
on historic properties (sometimes also referred to as "cultural resources") is one means of providing that comment
opportunity to the Advisory Council. Properties of traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe
(traditional cultural properties) are considered historic properties if they meet the eligibility criteria for inclusion on
the National Register of Historic Places, and agencies must consult with Indian tribes attaching religious or cultural
significance to those properties when carrying out their § 106 responsibilities. There is scant mention of the NHPA
in federal circuit court decisions addressing a party's appeal of a FERC licensing decision. There appears to be a
very low threshold for satisfying NHPA requirements, and there is no mandate for FERC to ameliorate all
potentially adverse effects that a proposed hydropower project may have on identified cultural resources. FERC has
historically treated these provisions as having a limited reach and sees them as aimed solely at discouraging federal
agencies from ignoring preservation values in projects they initiate, approve funds for, or otherwise control.
16
On FERC’s record regarding fish and wildlife, see Bodi & Erdheim, Swimming Upstream: FERC’s Failure to
Protect Anadromous Fish, 13 ECOLOGY L. Q. 7 (1986). See also, Blumm, A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC: Reforming
the Federal Role in Hydropower Licensing, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1986).
17
Among other things, ECPA did the following: 1) established new procedures for processing relicense applications
to increase opportunities for agencies, interested organizations, and the public to participate in the process; 2)
required FERC to base its recommendations for mitigating adverse effects of a licensing/relicensing proposal on the
recommendations of federal and state resource managing agencies and to negotiate with the agencies if
disagreements occur; and 3) required FERC to give the same level of consideration to the environment, recreation,
fish and wildlife, and other non-power values that are given to power and development objectives in making a
licensing/relicensing decision.
18
Prior to ECPA’s passage, FERC regulations required that license applicants consult with resource agencies prior
to submitting their final application to FERC. For more on the process, see infra, note and accompanying text.
19
Section 10 (j).
20
Id.
21
Section 12 of ECPA requires the agency to monitor and investigate compliance with each license and permit, and
provides the Commission with the authority to revoke licenses and issue penalties for non-compliance. For a critique
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We argue that these changes made a significant difference because, collectively, they
facilitated and intensified inter-agency lobbying.23 Taken together, the data tell us that agencies
do lobby one another; that Congress can make a difference by intensifying that lobbying; and
that additional lobbying alters agency outcomes.
We base this conclusion on six key findings. First, our data show that, on average, FERC
imposed more that twice the environmental conditions in dam re-licensing proceedings after
1990, a date by which we can be certain that ECPA had been fully implemented.24 Second, our
data show that public resource agencies representing environmental concerns intervened in
FERC re-licensing decisions more frequently than any other groups during the period we studied
(both before and after ECPA was passed).25 This tells us nothing in particular about the effect of
ECPA, but it does tell us that agencies are active players in the decision making processes of
sister agencies.
Third, by comparing public agency participation before and after ECPA, we show that
public agency participation increased after the statute was passed, climbing steadily over time.

of FERC’s monitoring and compliance investigations prior to ECPA, see John D. Echeverria, “The Electric
Consumer’s Protection Act of 1986” 8 Energy L. J. 61, 81-2(1987).
22
The difference between a substantive mandate and a procedural one can be less than clear. By substantive,
commentators usually mean requirements that more directly affect agency outcomes, either by dictating them or
constraining discretion to a greater extent. By procedural, they typically mean requirements that agencies must
follow, but which, once followed, do not necessarily affect the outcome—like a box the agency has to check before
doing what it wants to do anyway. For example, if a statute requires an agency to set safety standards within a given
range, or without regard to cost, such burdens might fairly be considered substantive. In these two examples,
respectively, if an agency sets a standard outside the specified range, or sets a lower standard because of cost
considerations, the agency risks being overturned. The statute in these two cases seems to constrain the agency’s
actual choice. However, if a statute requires an agency merely to consult another agency before rendering a decision,
commentators often consider this to be a procedural requirement. Now, if the agency skips the consultation it might
still be overturned, but as long as it does take that step, the agency’s ultimate decision remains in its discretion.
Ultimately, the agency will prevail if it dots its procedural “i”s and crosses it’s procedural “t”s. However, procedural
impositions of this kind can in practice affect substantive outcomes (e.g., a consultation could affect the agency’s
ultimate decision by providing it with new information, or the consultation might reveal information that gives a
reviewing court reason to doubt the rationality of the agency’s ultimate decision). And judges can make procedural
obligations seems more substantive, just as they can neutralize seemingly substantive impositions by making them
seem merely procedural (see e.g., Vermont Yankee v. NRDC holding that NEPA is a procedural statute despite
cases suggesting otherwise). So while we invoke the two categories of procedural and substantive as if they are
conceptually meaningful, in practice they can often amount to the same thing.
23
We chose the 1990 date for purposes of comparing public agency intervention rates, and numbers of
environmental conditions imposed, before and after ECPA because we believe that after 1990 we can be certain that
ECPA was fully implemented. To some extent, ECPA must have influenced FERC even sooner. Indeed, some of our
interviews suggest that the agency shifted course internally very quickly because it was already modifying its
approach to licensing. And we are aware that regulations often lag behind internal change. Still, the regulations
formally implementing ECPA took several years to produce, with the most important of them promulgated in 1988
and 1999. To be safe then, we assumed that ECPA was fully implemented only once those key rules were
promulgated. Even if we had chosen an earlier date, however, our conclusion would be the same. The time trend
shows a gradual increase in the effect of ECPA from 1986 on.
24
The number of conditions jumped from an average of about five to an average of twelve conditions.
25
Indeed, our data show that public agencies comprised 60% of all intervenors in FERC proceedings over this time.
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After 1990, by which the statute can be assumed to be fully operational, the rates of participation
jumped even more: the average participation of public intervenors in FERC licensing
proceedings increased 300 per cent after this date, from an average of 3.2 public intervenors to
an average of 10.5.26 While participation rates for all intervenors increased post-ECPA, none
spiked as much as the public agencies.27
Fourth, when more agencies intervene, outcomes change. Over the period we studied,
public intervenors had a significant impact on the number of environmental conditions imposed
by FERC: for every additional federal agency that attended a relicensing hearing, FERC imposed
an average of three-quarters of an additional environmental condition on the license; for every
additional state agency, FERC imposed an average of approximately one third of an additional
environmental condition. The average cumulative effect of federal and state agency participation
in FERC licensing proceedings is approximately four extra environmental conditions.
Fifth, the data show that the magnitude of the influence each of these public agencies
exerted on environmental conditions increased, almost doubling on average after ECPA was
fully implemented. Finally, when the increase in agency intervention is considered together
with the increase in the magnitude of their influence, we find that public agencies were
associated with 60 percent of all environmental conditions following the full implementation
ECPA, which is up from about 20 percent in the period prior to ECPA’s full implementation.
In short, on the basis of these findings, we hypothesize that inter-agency lobbying occurs,
that it affects outcomes, and that Congress can intervene to intensify it.
Our example illustrates how Congress can encourage an agency to internalize the
secondary mandates it has long ignored by augmenting the influence of other agencies on
decision making. In doing so, Congress can reinforce authority that the outside agencies may
already, to some extent, possess, but which for a variety of reasons have failed to use effectively.
Now one might ask: why should the result we observe be surprising? After all, as an
independent agency, FERC is a creature of Congress. By passing ECPA, Congress finally
ordered FERC to care about the environment, effectively saying, “we really mean it this time.”
Surely it makes sense for the agency to change its ways. But what interests us is that Congress
does this in a particular way—by reinforcing and invigorating outside agencies as lobbyists. And
this succeeds where other attempts to influence the agency— via the imposition of separate
environmental mandates in statutes like NEPA—have failed. Thus, inter-agency lobbying may
be part of the solution to the problem of the reluctant agency.
To be clear, we do not claim that ECPA was solely responsible for overcoming FERC’s
reluctance to comply with its secondary environmental mandates. Indeed, the agency was
already, in the early eighties, taking these obligations more seriously because of a combination of
events, including significant losses in the courts. As one FERC insider put it, “we were getting
26

This represents the biggest absolute increase of any types of intervenors in FERC’s licensing decisions.
The participation by all intervenors rose from an average of about five to an average of almost sixteen--a tripling
in participation.

27
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whacked, repeatedly.” Indeed, the number of environmental conditions per license had already
begun to rise when ECPA was passed.28 Still, we argue, passing ECPA made a difference. The
statute clearly intensified the underlying inter-agency dynamic, encouraging agencies to be even
more aggressive than they might otherwise have been, and locking in their influence in
perpetuity. Our data show that the boost ECPA gave to fish and wildlife agencies had a
meaningful effect, independent of the other influences that also encouraged FERC to change.
With our argument, we hope to enrich a number of debates. First, we contribute to the
literature on political control of delegated discretion. We see inter-agency lobbying as a form of
indirect or “lateral” legislative control over agencies, which supplements other forms of
legislative control.29 Our argument, therefore, builds on and extends the literature in political
science regarding congressional control of delegated authority. 30 While scholars have studied
both ex ante statutory constraints and ex post oversight as potential instruments of control, they
have paid little attention to the prospect of relying on agencies. Scholars have argued that
Congress uses a variety of tools to control agency policymaking: by limiting agency discretion
through specific language; by structuring agencies in ways that favor particular outcomes; by
adding administrative procedures that are meant to “stack the deck”31 in favor of certain interest
groups; by structuring the agency in such a way that it automatically favors particular interests;
by engaging in direct oversight by congressional committees; and by enabling interest groups to
alert Congress to agency misbehavior by pulling “fire alarms.”32 Given this expansive literature,

28

See Cornelius M. Kerwin, Transforming Regulation: A Case Study of Hydropower Licensing, Pub. Admin. Rev.
91, 95 (1990) (showing recommendations per license climbing from 4.5 in 1980 to a high of 9.4 in 1984 and back to
6.7 in 1986 for an average of 6.2 per license over a six year period). As Kerwin points out, this was likely a response
to a number of influences, including successful litigation that limited the agency’s capacious reach and unmitigated
focus on power benefits; successful lobbying by environmental interests; and, to some extent, anticipation of ECPA
itself. See discussion at infra note, and accompanying text.
29
For a study of congressional efforts at imposing “structure” and “process” controls on FERC ex ante, which
similarly focuses on FERC licensing decisions see, David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to
Steer Administrative Agencies 28 J. L. STUD. 413 (1999). Spence concludes that the effectiveness of such controls,
including ECPA, varies: certain kinds of changes appear to influence agency decisions while others do not. See also,
Jeffrey S. Hill and James Brazier, Constraining Administrative Decisions: A Critical Examination of the Structure
and Process Hypothesis, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 373 (1991) (concluding that the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act did not on balance make FERC more responsive to environmental concerns).
30
See, e.g., Matthew McCubbins & Talbot Page, “A Theory of Congressional Delegation,” in CONGRESS:
STRUCTURE AND POLICY (McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds. 1987).
31
See generally, McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization (1987); Pablo T. Spiller & John Ferejohn, The Economics and Politics of
Administrative Law and Procedures: An Introduction, JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION (1992);
Barry Weingast & Mark Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Policy-Making by the FTC,
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 91(1983); Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of
Congressional Oversight. Brookings Institution, 1990.
32
See Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI 165 (1984) (herinafter McCubbins and Schwartz, Police Patrols). It should be
noted that claims about the extent to which such attempts are successful are hotly debated. Legal scholars in
particular have resisted claims by political scientists that Congress can effectively manipulate structures and
procedures in such ways. See e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Procss: Normative, Positive, and
Critical Stories of Legal Development, 6 J. L. Econ. & Org. 267 (1990) (arguing that procedures enable not only the
“winning coalition” of interest groups to influence agencies but also open the agency to the influence of the losers);
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the notion that Congress might seek to alter an agency’s behavior by imposing an additional
mandate is not new. What is new is the finding that effective legislative control can take the form
of inter-agency lobbying.33
We contribute, as well, to the literature on interest group theory, by drawing on the
literature about political control described above. In forcing a reluctant agency to internalize
secondary mandates by strengthening the hand of other agencies, Congress re-structures the
interest group market. We show that public agencies are the most frequent participant in FERC
proceedings, that their presence increased following ECPA, and that this caused a jump in
environmental conditions. Our result about the impact of inter-agency lobbying is surprising
given traditional interest group theory, which suggests that private interest groups, such as
license applicants, are best situated to dominate agency outcomes. We show, by contrast, that
public agencies not only participate in this market, but can effectively dominate it.
Political science already tells us that Congress can intervene to adjust the existing interest
group market in which participants compete to influence agencies. Yet the focus of most of this
work is private actors and non-profits; much of interest group theory seeks to explain why some
of these groups have more influence than others. We add a missing ingredient to the mix by
suggesting that public agencies may be effective participants in this market, and that Congress
can intervene to embolden them, just as Congress might intervene to empower private
organizations.34
In addition, our argument builds a bridge between the two literatures just described—
theories of legislative control and theories of interest group influence—by positing inter-agency
lobbying as a potential mechanism for counter-balancing private influence over agencies, a
phenomenon we call “unstacking the deck.” If public agencies are effective at influencing sister
agencies, and if Congress can intervene to make them more so, perhaps these agencies will give
voice to a set of interests that might balance or neutralize the influence of private (usually wellfinanced and industry dominated), groups. Traditional public choice theory would predict that
private groups representing concentrated costs and benefits would prevail in this setting. Yet
such predictions might need to be modified to account for the impact of public agencies.

Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. Econ. &
Org. 93 (1992).
33
We are not the first to note the important role that federal and state agencies play in FERC licensing. See Kerwin,
Transforming Regulation, supra, note _ (concluding that, among other forces, input from fish and wildlife agencies
during the eighties led FERC to adopt more environmental conditions). Kerwin’s data and argument are generally
congruent with ours though his focus is not on the inter-agency process as an instrument of congressional control,
and he provides no empirical test of ECPA’s impact on this dynamic. Kerwin’s argument focuses instead on how
FERC used traditional regulatory tools, including rulemaking and negotiation, to enlist outside agencies in its
licensing process, demonstrating both adaptiveness and responsiveness.
34
Spence, supra, does not discuss inter-agency lobbying per se, but he does note that Congress may purposely
choose to give power to one agency over another based on what Congress knows about agency policy preferences.
He calls this form of structural control a “distribution of power” type of control. This line of thinking suggests that
Congress should be able to anticipate how empowering one agency might serve to check the discretion of another.
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We expect our argument to interest both political scientists and legal scholars. A great
deal of inter-agency communication occurs in the administrative state, most of it informal and
relatively invisible. Yet scholars know relatively little about it. For the most part, scholars
complain about the ad hoc and inconsistent nature of inter-agency coordination, treating it as a
problem for the executive branch to fix, presumably through better management. Usually this
takes the form of calls for more inter-agency task forces or greater centralization through
oversight by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).35 But our understanding of interagency lobbying as a form of lateral legislative control puts the “problem” of inter-agency
“conflict” into a new light.
First, inter-agency conflict can be productive. Agencies with specialized expertise in one
area can press their counterparts to modify decisions in another. Because agencies represent
different constituencies, and adhere to different statutory mandates, the inter-agency process may
serve as an important vehicle for interest mediation in the policy process. It may also function as
a relatively transparent mechanism for coordinating activity across multiple agencies with
conflicting interests.
Second, our account suggests that inter-agency coordination need not be a uniquely
executive branch pre-occupation. Our study shows that Congress can strengthen inter-agency
lobbying for congressional purposes. There are a number of reasons why Congress may do so,
which we explain.36
Surprisingly, there is a dearth of academic literature analyzing the extent to which interagency dynamics affect agency outcomes, and how those dynamics might be manipulated by
both congressional and executive principals. Our study takes a small step in the direction of
exploring this phenomenon. Among other things, it prompts us to ask, what are the implications
of inter-agency lobbying for separation of powers concerns? In our example, Congress enhances
the authority of some agencies to help it control the discretion of another agency. But this
strategy may yield some degree of control over the inter-agency process to the president, who
can intervene to determine how the lobbying process will play out.37 The separation of powers
implications may be especially significant in cases such as ours, where the lobbying agencies are
executive, and the lobbied agencies independent, since the prospects for gains in executive over
congressional power may be greater in these cases, assuming that Congress typically has greater
leverage over independent agencies than it does over executive ones.38

35

Sometimes it results in structural changes within the executive branch to help the President coordinate policy e.g.,
President Clinton’s creation of a National Economic Council with representatives from Treasury, the Council of
Economic Advisors, Labor, and others agencies to coordinate the administration’s economic policy.
36
See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1443 (hereinafter DeShazo and Freeman, Congressional Competition).
37
Through a variety of tools—many informal—the president may encourage agencies to stand down when they
might otherwise intervene to press their statutory interests, or persuade them to intervene more vigorously when they
might otherwise see no need to do so.
38
This assumption may be unfounded, however. As many commentators have noted, independents may, in practice
behave very much like executive agencies even when not legally obligated to do so. For example, independents
often try to comply with executive orders. There appears to be some variation among the independents over how
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In addition, our point about inter-agency lobbying should interest scholars of
administrative law and statutory interpretation for at least two reasons. As Mashaw, Strauss and
other have pointed out, debates over statutory interpretation focus almost exclusively on judicial
approaches to interpretation, ignoring the process of agency interpretation39 By raising the
problem of the “reluctant” agency faced with multiple mandates, we focus much needed
attention on how agencies resolve potential conflicts and determine their statutory missions.
While we do not undertake here to demonstrate how agencies interpret statutes in practice
(something that would require its own empirical study),40 or to recommend how they should do
so (which would call for an elaborate normative argument), our study illustrates some of the
difficulties agencies encounter as they wrestle with multiple tasks assigned to them over time,
including the need to answer to multiple principals.41
Second, scholars of administrative law and statutory interpretation should be interested in
inter-agency lobbying because it may offer a new rationale for judicial deference. The fact that
multiple agencies have been meaningfully involved in the exercise of discretion could be seen as
additional rationale for deferring to the lead agency’s decision. In cases of disagreement among
agencies, however, there may be good reasons for the reviewing court to defer to the views of the
external agencies, assuming they have been specifically empowered by Congress to play a
consultative role in the lead agency’s decision making process.42
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we explain the factors that contribute to the
problem of agency reluctance, using our FERC case study as an illustration. In Part III, we
explain the range of tools that might force agencies to comply with secondary mandates imposed
on them via separate statutes passed after their enabling legislation, but we note that in the FERC
example, each of these tools proved limited. We then explain the events leading up to ECPA, and
the difference the statute made,introducing our argument that it was effective because it
facilitated inter-agency lobbying. In Part IV, we present our empirical data, which supports our
argument about inter-agency lobbying. Finally, in Part V, we discuss the theoretical implications
of our findings, including our contribution to the literatures on legislative control and interest
group theory. We also speculate that inter-agency lobbying may have separation of powers
implications, and that it might affect judicial review of agency decisionmaking.

truly independent they are in practice, and this depends on history, culture and personality as much as agency
structure.
39
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, Article 9 (2002). Available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9.
40
See Mashaw, supra at, suggesting different approaches one might use but simply does a survey of rulemakings at
EPA and HHS to do a quick impressionistic study.
41
See Mashaw, supra note at, referring to the fact that agencies must respond to multiple principals as one among
many examples of how agencies differ from courts in their interpretive approach. .
42
We thank Lois Schiffer, former Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division of
Department of Justice, for raising this possibility.
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II. FERC AS A RELUCTANT AGENCY
In theory, all statutory mandates are created equal. That is, when Congress instructs an
agency to do something (set health standards; allocate disability benefits; gather intelligence),
and even when it tells an agency to do two conflicting things at once, the agency must comply.
This is true regardless of when and how such mandates are passed; whether they are assigned to
the agency in its organic statute or later on; and whether they come in the form of an amendment
to the organic statute or in separate pieces of legislation.
So if Congress creates a Federal Power Commission in 1920 to license projects best
adapted to “the most comprehensive plan designed to improve the waterway…,”43 and then in
the 1960s tells the agency to consult with federal and state agencies to ensure that dam licensing
does not jeopardize endangered species or compromise state water quality standards, the agency
must do it all. And in theory, congressional, executive and judicial oversight, are designed to
ensure agency compliance. Potential sanctions for agency failure to fulfill statutory mandates
include political embarrassment at congressional hearings, vulnerability to auditing and
investigation, the threat of losing appropriations, and even elimination of the agency. The
President can punish non-compliant agencies as well, through his appointment and removal
powers, his budget proposals, and by resorting to informal political sanctions. And of course,
interest groups can challenge, and courts can invalidate, unlawful agency action.
How then, did FERC come largely to ignore both the non-power concerns in the FPA
(e.g., recreation), and the specifically environmental mandates that came along later in a variety
of environmental laws? In this section, we explain the factors that we suspect operated to
encourage FERC’s disregard for these additional mandates. In short, we find a systematic failure,
across all principals, to force the agency to comply with its non-power mandates.
A. The Enabling Act
To a significant extent, the original statute itself determined FERC’s attitude toward
licensing. The Federal Water Power Act was passed to centralize authority over licensing
hydropower specifically in order to promote it. Prior to passage of the Act, the Secretaries of
War, Agriculture and Interior each had authority to issue licenses for hydroelectric projects on
lands under their respective jurisdiction, which led to confusion and inefficiency. The FPA
centralized authority in a single agency, the Federal Power Commission, which was to consist of
the three Secretaries. Ten years later Congress reorganized the agency to consist of five
commissioners independent of the three Secretaries. Congress soon after passed the Federal
Power Act of 1935, encompassing most of the FWPA.44 In 1977 the agency’s powers were
reassigned to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.45

43

See FPA §10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (2003).
16 U.S.C. § 791a (1994).
45
Department of Energy Organization Act, 1977.
44
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The original statutory mission assigned to the FPC was unmistakably pro-power.46 The
Commission was given broad authority to grant licenses for fifty years to non-federal public and
private entities for the construction and operation of hydroelectric facilities.47 The purpose of the
law was to facilitate power production. Prior to the FPA’s enactment, Congress authorized
hydropower licenses on a case by case basis. President Theodore Roosevelt sought to provide
more determinate licensing, and to centralize control in the federal government. After he vetoed
dam related legislation that did not meet these conditions, Congress finally acted in accordance
with his wishes.48
The FPA issued hundreds of licenses in these early years, the majority of the total
licenses it would ultimately approve.49 During this period, and through the Second World War,
there was a strong national imperative to generate power with virtually no consideration of
recreational or environmental consequences.50 The 30s and 40s was known as the “Big Dam”
era, 51 during which the Commission was concerned solely with developing hydropower to meet
the needs of a growing economy.52 Dams were identified with progress and American
technological ingenuity.53 At the time, relatively little was known about the harm dams could

46

For an early history of the FPC and a description of its organization, see, Milton Conover, The Federal Power
Commission, Brookings, 1923 at 1-2. The FPC’s “function is to exercise general administrative control over all
water-power sites…located on the navigable waters, on the public lands, and on the reservations of the United
States….the commission is required to issue permits and licenses for the purpose of utilizing dams, reservoirs,
power houses, water conduits, transmission lines, and kindred projects. It must regulate, under certain conditions,
the financial operations of water power industries including the rates of service. It must make physical valuations of
the properties of power enterprises, determine the character of their services, and control the operation of power
projects. The significance of these functions is obviated by the almost inexhaustible immensity of the water-power
resources of the United States, the growing practice of substituting water-power for steam power, and by the
constant appearance of new inventions for the further utilization of water-power in industry….The seemingly
unlimited uses of hydroelectric power in industry and in the rising standards of living indicates the undetermined
volume of future water-power permits that must be granted by the Federal Power Commission, and the vast amount
of industrial regulation that they may have to exercise.”
47
“Licenses are issued to citizens and municipalities for the purpose of constructing and maintaining water-power
plants, and all of the necessary accessories thereto. They are also issued for the construction of project works that
may aid in the improvement of navigation….Practically all of the preliminary work that is required on the
applications for permits, licenses…is performed through the Engineering Division and the engineering forces of the
Departments of War, Interior, and Agriculture.” Conover, supra note, at 69-70.
48
“The primary emphasis in 1920 was hydropower development…” See H.R. Rep. 99-507, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2498. “Congress generally embodied President Roosevelt’s views…” Id. at 2499. Roosevelt insisted that the public
retain control of the waterways and that license terms be limited to fifty years. “Provision should be made for the
termination of the grant or privilege at a definite time, leaving to future generations the power or authority to renew
or extend the concession in accordance with the conditions which may prevail at the time.” See H.R. Rep. No. 99507, at 11(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. C.C.A.N. 2496, 2498, as quoted in
49
See Kerwin, supra note_at
50
See Charles S. Sensiba, Who’s In Charge Here? The Shrinking Role of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission in Hydropower Relicensing 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 603, 619 (1999). See Richardson, supra note at 502.
51
Richardson, supra note at 500.
52
See Sensiba, supra note. Hydropower licensing did slow somewhat in the late forties when, as Kerwin points out,
more efficient forms of energy became commercially feasible. See Kerwin, supra at 92. But licensing would pick up
again during the energy crisis of the seventies. See infra note and accompanying text.
53
Id.
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cause to aquatic resources and habitat.54 Environmental values had yet to take hold in the public
consciousness, let alone in legislation.
In section 10(a) of the FWPA, Congress gave the FPC fairly unbounded discretion to
grant hydropower licenses. The only limitation on that discretion comes in the form of an
instruction to prefer projects “best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing
a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the
improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses
including recreational purposes….” Conceivably, this broad language might encompass
environmental values (in both recreational purposes and in the larger category of beneficial
public uses), and eventually courts held that it did. Still, both the legislative history and political
context of the time make clear that recreational or environmental values were not meant to
compete with the overriding need for licensing dams to help satisfy the nation’s energy needs.
It is not, therefore, surprising that FERC resisted considering recreational and other
beneficial public uses referred to in § 10(a). At its inception, the FPC seems to have viewed the
question of whether to consider non-power values under the FPA as entirely within its
discretion.55 The agency viewed itself as the sole authority over hydropower, having been
delegated extremely broad discretion by Congress.
This attitude would take root in FERC and shape its culture for the next fifty years. And
although the hydropower industry originally resisted Congress’ attempt to centralize licensing
authority (because it feared that the free-wheeling laissez faire state attitude toward resource
exploitation might be curbed by the federal government), it came around to support FERC.56
Though power had been centralized and the terms of licenses limited to fifty years, FERC
adopted a pro-exploitation attitude, bestowing licenses upon virtually all applicants. A statute
that gave the agency broad discretion and that enfranchised a clientele of powerful licensees
would contribute to the agency’s later reluctance in the face of environmental mandates.
B. Culture and Expertise
As they interpret their statutory mandates, agencies tend to internalize a particular
mission, develop an agency culture, and cultivate a unique expertise. FERC is certainly not the
first agency to adopt a sense of mission that endures over time; many agencies develop strong
identities in their early years that prove resilient to change.57 In our example, FERC clearly

54

See supra note 11 on the harms dams can cause.
“The statutory delegation of authority to the FERC to determine how a public resource will be used drew
intellectual support from a progressive-era faith in expertise and rational scientific management….As an
independent commission, the FERC would determine what the public interest was in dam licensing decisions and
could do so based on sound technical studies and insulated from political pressure.” Stephenson, supra, note at 484.
56
Richardson, supra notenote at 504.
57
See Mazmanian and Nienabauer, Organizations, supra, note 7 (documenting the Army Corps of Eingineers’
resistance to modifying its historical mission of building large water-resource development projects in light of the
environmental imperatives of NEPA. Note also contemporary accounts of FBI “cops” and CIA “spooks” in
descriptions of the different cultures of the two law enforcement agencies. See MARK RIEBLING, WEDGE: FROM
55
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developed a pro-power culture. This was reflected in, and reinforced by, its internal
organizational structure and its dependence on professional engineers. The agency’s early
organization consisted of three sparsely populated divisions—operations, legal and accounting—
along with a more substantial Engineering Division of sixteen men, plus a number of field
personnel who were all engineers from other federal departments. The agency contained no
division devoted to fisheries or recreational interests.58 Not surprisingly, the engineers’ priority
was dam safety, not the conservation of fish and wildlife or the protection of recreational and
aesthetic values. From the start, engineers were to play a key role in the licensing process, and
their dominance persisted until the mid-eighties.59
Because of its deeply rooted pro-power identity, and the role played internally by
engineers, FERC never developed the expertise necessary to competently analyze the non-power
effects of its licensing program. Yet while hydropower was, and still is, considered an
inexpensive and relatively clean source of energy60 dams have a significant adverse impact on
the environment, by altering flow rates and water quality. Inadequate stream flow due to
impounded water can destroy fish habitat and spawning areas, and can adversely affect upstream
and downstream fish passage.61 At this time, however, there were no wildlife or fish biologists in
the agency to introduce the possibility of mitigating the adverse effects of dams; no one to
counter the views of the engineers; and no one to communicate effectively with their
professional counterparts in the resource agencies.
In particular, FERC had no familiarity with the kind of comprehensive and longer term
planning necessary to properly protect environmental resources. Indeed, the agency had never
conducted a general planning process for its licensing program. As with many New Deal
agencies, it proceeded to make policy on a case by case—license to license. This incremental
approach would prove especially damaging to riverine resources in cases where multiple dams
were licensed in the same river basin.62 FERC simply avoided confronting the cumulative effect
of its hydropower projects. Developing this expertise would have been culturally wrenching for
the agency, and also enormously costly.

PEARL HARBOR TO 9/11--HOW THE SECRET WAR BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA HAS ENDANGERED NATIONAL
SECURITY (2002).
58
See Conover, supra note at 75-82
59
Early annual reports from the FPC contain descriptions of the agency’s structure, and later reports contain
organization charts, all of which indicate that even as the Commission grew larger and increasingly complex over
the years, its original structure remained basically the same, with law, engineering and administration/accounting at
the center. In a an annual report from 1937, the Commission is divided into a Bureau of Administration, a Bureau of
Law and a Bureau of Engineering and a Bureau of Finance and Accounts. See Seventeenth Annual Report of the
Federal Power Commission, 1937. On an organization chart from the 1963 annual report one sees an Office of
Economics, an Office of Accounting and Finance, a Bureau of Power and a Bureau of Natural Gas. See Forty-Third
Annual Report of the Federal Power Commission, 1964.
60
See Kurt Stephenson, Taking Nature Into Account: Observations About the Changing Role of Analysis and
Negotiation in Hydropower Relicensing 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 473, 474 (2000). Hydropower is a
relatively cheap, renewable form of energy, and it does not produce the emissions associated with fossil fuels (such
as particulates, ozone precursors and greenhouse gases).
61
See supra note at.
62
See Kerwin, supra note at.
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In the absence of strong signals to change, FERC understandably stuck with its propower orientation. In the first sixty years of its existence, it denied a proposed license only
once.63 The agency became known as a friend of the hydro-power industry and was derided for
“never having met a dam it didn’t like.”64 Its attitude toward environmental concerns was, if not
openly hostile, then consistently obstructionist. It appears to have viewed resource agencies with
management responsibilities for fish and wildlife primarily as irritants.65 The agency simply
believed that it was substituting for Congress in determining the conditions under which to issue
licenses. Although specific sections of the FPA appeared to grant resource agencies the power to
impose mandatory conditions on certain licenses (on Indian Reservations, for example),66 FERC
read these provisions of the Act as if they were merely advisory. “Talk about adopting a cultural
bias when reading the law,” remarks one insider, “FERC thought it was clearly in charge.”67 In
short, the original pro-power statutory mandate, and the political environment in which the
agency was created powerfully shaped the agency’s sense of mission.
C. Oversight
1. Congressional Oversight
Of course, a statute as drafted by the enacting majority does not by itself determine
agency behavior. Statutory language is subject to interpretation, and agencies interpret their
statutory mandates in light of congressional, executive and judicial oversight.68 The three
principals frequently send agencies mixed messages, and these messages can shift over time.
Agencies must be attentive as new administrations take office; as control of Congress changes
hands; as membership of congressional committees shifts; and as judicial thinking evolves. A
failure of agency responsiveness can lead to repeated interventions by one or more of these
principals, an erosion of support for the agency, and, ultimately, the imposition of constraints
that limit the agency’s jurisdiction and discretion.
It would have been risky, therefore, for FERC to have ignored or minimized non-power
concerns for recreation and fisheries if congressional oversight had not consistently signaled the
agency that power mattered most. In our example, FERC clearly received a pro-power message
from its congressional overseers in its first few decades of very active licensing, through the post
war period, and into the late seventies.

63

See Richardson, supra note at 509.
Interview with Ralph Cavanagh, Senior Attorney, NRDC, March 9, 2005, on file with author.
65
FERC did occasionally take environmental values into account, but as Spence points out, this was rare. The
agency invalidated the Namekagon Hydro Company’s license application in 1953 on environmental grounds,
because the project would be located on a scenic river. See Spence, supra note at n.39 and accompanying text.
66
See § 4 (e) which requires in part that licenses, “shall be subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of
the department under whose supervision such reservation falls shall deem necessary for the adequate protection and
utilization of such resource…” 16 U.S.C. §787(e) (1994).
67
Interview with Mark Robinson, Director, Office of Energy Projects, FERC, March 11, 2005, on file with author.
68
See Mashaw, supra, note 41, on the subject of statutory interpretation by agencies and how it is likely to differ
from statutory interpretation by courts.
64
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Even as the environmental movement took shape and Congress began passing
environmental legislation in the early seventies, oversight over FERC did not suddenly shift.
Congress may have been sending the country a pro-environmental message by passing NEPA in
1970, the modern CAA in 1970, the modern CWA in 1972, and the ESA in 1973, but the
oversight committees were continuing to sending FERC a pro-power one.69 Indeed, right on the
heels of passing the most significant federal environmental legislation in history, Congress
passed a spate of energy related legislation between 1978 and 1980 that sought to respond to the
energy crisis by reducing the nation’s dependence on foreign oil. In 1978, Congress passed the
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), which created incentives for small private firms
to undertake hydropower projects.70 The Act guaranteed to these applicants very favorable rates
of return, offered attractive depreciation rates for tax purposes, and granted exemptions from
time-consuming licensing procedures for smaller projects.71 Congress also amended other
statutes such as the Energy Security Act72 and the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Act, to include
additional incentives.73
A biologist working at FERC at the time described the package of incentives as a “license
to print money” for hydropower.74 So profitable did Congress make it for operators to build
hydropower projects, and so eagerly did the applicants descend upon FERC for new licenses,
that the period would become known as the “hydro power gold rush.”75 Notably, the legislation
had opened licensing to a new class of smaller, private applicants that were largely unfamiliar
with the licensing process. These applicants had no experience consulting with fish and wildlife
agencies, and were not inclined to look favorably on the imposition of expensive environmental
conditions that would cut into their anticipated profits.76
Thus, after a period of relative quiet, when virtually all of the original fifty year licenses
were still in effect, and only the occasional new application came across the agency’s desk, the
energy legislation of the late seventies spurred a boom in licensing activity at FERC; the agency
received thousands of hydropower preliminary permit and development applications. The pace of
licensing was intense, and the agency all but ignored environmental concerns.77 Legislative
oversight was sending FERC a clear pro-power message.

69

Our data suggests that even as late as 1986, and after ECPA was passed, members of the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources maintained their pro-power orientation. The effect of each additional member on the
oversight committee who is from the jurisdiction of license applicant, reduces the number of environmental
conditions imposed on licenses.
70
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617.
71
See George C. O’Connor, Will the Hydropower Program Revive in the 90s? 14 Energy L. J. 127, 129-132 (1993)
(describing the terms of PURPA, and its effects).
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982). See also regulations in 18 C.F.R. §292.101 (1986).
72
42 U.S.C. § 737 (1988).
26 U.S.C. § 4994 (1982) (incorporating 10 C.F.R. § 212.54(c) (1979)) (repealed 1988).
74
Robinson interview, supra notenote.
75
See Echeverria, supra, note at 76, quoting Representative Wyden in 123 CONG. REC. H8962.
76
Cavanaugh interview, supra note.
77
O’Connor, supra, note at 130, claiming that 1471 exemption applications were filed between 1980 and 1985 and
that the Commission issued 775 exemptions during that time. “During that same period there were approximately 5,
609 preliminary permits and 439 licesnes issued by the Commission.”
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2. Executive Oversight
The role played by executive oversight in the story of the reluctant agency is equally
complicated. In theory, executive oversight should work to force agency compliance with all
applicable statutory mandates, at least for executive agencies. In practice, however, just as we
have seen with legislative oversight, executive oversight may instead encourage agencies to
comply with their primary mandate alone, or confuse them with mixed messages.
And the situation is more complicated still when it comes to presidential oversight of
independent agencies like FERC. The President’s power over the independent commissions is
constrained. For example, the president has limited appointment and removal power over board
members or commissioners, though typically he has the power to select the Chair.78 Still, the
White House can exert informal political pressure on members of independent agencies and the
president can influence such agencies indirectly by threatening to veto legislation moving
through Congress.
To the extent that executive oversight has made an impact on FERC, the signaling has
been consistently pro-power. It was a president, Teddy Roosevelt, who initially championed the
centralization of authority over hydropower in a federal agency in order to harness a cheap and
plentiful source of energy and subsequent presidents have followed suit.79 Through the
Progressive era and the Second World War, successive presidents seemed to be in lock step with
Congress: the nation needed power, and the domestic economic benefits of licensing public and
private dams were substantial. In the ensuing years, as hydro-power became a relatively less
important source of energy, FERC’s hydro power program slipped under the radar,80 but
administrations seemed largely to leave FERC alone. Without providing a comprehensive history
of the period, it seems fair to say that no White House through the Nixon administration sought
to pressure FERC, directly or indirectly, to address fisheries and other non-power effects of
hydropower licensing.
One might have expected this to change in the seventies, as environmental values took
hold in legislation. President Nixon created the EPA in 1970 and marketed himself to voters as
the environmental President. In the early and middle part of the decade, Congress passed—and
succeeding presidents signed—a raft of federal environmental legislation.81 However, the late
seventies also brought the energy crisis, which renewed interest in domestic energy production
and in developing alternatives to oil. The Carter administration supported congressional efforts
to expand the market for hydropower by encouraging licensing of smaller private applicants.

78

This is perhaps more significant for FERC than other agencies; among other things, the large staff works
exclusively for the Chair.
79
See Connor, supra note
80
Interview with Bill Massey, former FERC Commissions, March 13, 2005, on file with author, noting that
hydropower plays a relatively small role compared to natural gas and electricity regulation in FERC’s portfolio and
that he was surprised at the intensity of interest in hydropower among members of the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources during his confirmation hearings.
81
CAA in 1970; CWA in 1972; ESA in 1973; RCRA in 1976; CAA amendments in 1977.
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President Carter signed PURPA and the related legislation that ushered in the hydro gold rush.
The administration clearly supported the revitalization of FERC’s licensing process.
Yet, even though there are no signs of high level pressure on FERC to accommodate
environmental concerns during this period, line staff in executive branch agencies like the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFS), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Forest
Service (USFS) tried, in a less visible way, to force FERC to take its environmental obligations
seriously. The fish and wildlife agencies intervened in FERC’s licensing process and joined
lawsuits challenging several specific licenses. This suggests either that the Carter administration
was sending mixed messages to FERC while trying to balance energy and environmental
concerns, or that these resource agencies were able to act somewhat independently of direct
White House control.
Even during the Reagan administration, which was notoriously anti-environmental,82 the
staff of the federal fish and wildlife agencies continued to pressure FERC. Kerwin speculates
that because the administration was so clearly de-regulatory and pro-power, the agencies did this
rather quietly, preferring to negotiate with FERC so as not to arouse the ire of the White House.83
Yet the agencies quite visibly continued to intervene in licensing proceedings and they
participated in (although did not lead) lawsuits challenging the agency in court.84 Why would the
Reagan administration, which had cut the budgets of these agencies and taken such public antienvironmental stances, tolerate this inter-agency pressure? Perhaps they were unaware of it, as
Kerwin suggests. Perhaps perfect control over these employees simply eluded the administration
because of high transaction and opportunity costs. Perhaps career agency staff defied instructions
out of frustration with the administration’s agenda. Whatever the reason, it does seem that in this
case agency staff maintained some decisional independence from the political appointees at the
top.
Despite the activity of the fish and wildlife agencies, however, executive pressure on
FERC was never public, consistent or vigorous enough to counteract FERC’s strong pro-power
82

The Reagan administration took office with an anti-regulatory agenda and promptly sought to weaken
environmental regulations. See Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts & Stephen R. Thomas, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, 1994 at 245-279. The administration appointed Ann Gorsuch, an outspoken critic of
environmental regulation, as the EPA administrator. Upon accepting the appointment, Ms. Gorsuch said “I took the
job because I wanted to bring a politically conservative approach to solving the management problems of
environmental protection." On Gorsuch’s watch, EPA personnel were reduced by 23 percent and referrals to the
Justice Department dropped by half. She fired the head of the Superfund and RCRA programs and refused to
comply with Congress's demand that she turn over internal Agency documents dealing with Superfund enforcement.
She soon after resigned in controversy in 1983. See Richarrd J. Lazarus, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
2005 at 99-106. Many commentators who were at EPA or working in environmental organizations during this period
have referred to it as “a dark time at the agency.” See e.g., interview with Peter Wyckoff, former Assistant GC at
EPA; Bill Pederson, former Assistant General Counsel at EPA; David Doniger, Senior attorney, Natural Resources
Defense Council.
83
Kerwin, supra note.
84
Kerwin argues that the agencies preferred quiet negotiation during this period to direct opposition to energy on the
theory that this would escape the scrutiny of the White House. Yet it is hard to believe that the Reagan
administration wouldn’t be aware of even this softer negotiation strategy, and wouldn’t be inclined to put a stop to it
if it could. See Kerwin, supra note at 97.
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disposition. Of course, as an independent agency, FERC might have ignored White House
signals had they been sent, but the Commissioners would have at least paid a political price for
doing so. And if the issue were salient enough, the White House might have gone over the heads
of both the Commission and Congress to the public. This never happened, however. FERC was,
as a result, left to pursue its pro-power agenda well into the eighties, while giving its
environmental mandates relatively short shrift.
3. Judicial Oversight
Judicial review might also help to force reluctant agencies to take their secondary
mandates seriously. As with other forms of oversight, however, judicial review has its
limitations. In our example, FERC was able to remain a reluctant agency for a long time, despite
mounting pressure from the federal courts.
First, judicial review emerged as a potential limitation on FERC only in the late sixties.
There are at least three reasons why. First, until then, the environmental movement had not
developed sufficiently to create organized interest groups capable of maintaining litigation
campaigns. Second, there were few opportunities or incentives for plaintiffs to sue FERC for
failure to comply with environmental mandates given the relative dearth of environmental laws
that provided them with causes of action. And finally, those entities with the most relevant
expertise and the greatest chance of influencing FERC were federal fish and wildlife agencies,
which preferred not to sue other federal agencies.85
Things began to change in 1965 with the landmark Scenic Hudson case, in which a
federal circuit court invalidated FERC’s issuance of a license and held, for the first time, at the
behest of environmental groups, that “recreational purposes” in § 10(a) of the FPA encompassed
“conservation of natural resources, maintenance of natural beauty and the preservation of historic
sites.”86 The Court held that FERC was obligated to consider the environmental issues raised by
the intervenors, including fish and wildlife agencies and tribes, prior to issuing the license rather
than monitoring effects afterwards, which was the agency’s practice.
After Scenic Hudson, a variety of plaintiffs including tribes, environmental groups and
federal and state wildlife agencies, brought lawsuits challenging virtually every aspect of
FERC’s licensing process. Only two years later, in Udall vs. Federal Power Commission,87 the
Supreme Court made clear that section 10 of the FPA obligated FERC to consider and protect
fish and wildlife in its licensing decisions. FERC was admonished for failing to consider all
“relevant factors” beyond the need for power, including recreation, fish and wildlife, flood
85

While such suits are technically lawful, they tend to be frowned upon, especially among executive agencies. The
Department of Justice has a policy of declining referrals of cases in which one executive agency seeks to sue
another. The rationale usually offered for this is the theory of the Unitary Executive embodied in Article II of the
Constitution, which is thought to prohibit such internecine litigation. The situation between executive agencies and
independents is more complicated, however. These lawsuits do occur, but they are still uncommon. In most of the
lawsuits challenging FERC’s licensing, federal fish and wildlife agencies are intervenors.
86
See Scenic Hudson v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) at 614.
87
387 US 428 (1967).
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control, and irrigation. The Court held that FERC was obligated to do this earlier, more explicitly
and more carefully.
One would think that such high profile lawsuits would have prompted FERC to modify
its behavior, even if Congress and the executive branch had remained largely pro-power in their
oversight. But FERC initially acted as if Scenic Hudson had never happened. And it continued to
drag its feet throughout the seventies as the losses mounted. Indeed, FERC refused even to issue
regulations regarding how the agency would implement NEPA. The Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) had required all federal agencies to develop a compliance plan, but FERC took
the position that as an independent agency, it was not subject to the CEQ guidelines.88
This is neither unique nor surprising; such behavioor is characteristic of the reluctant
agency. Judicial oversight may, over time, affect agency behavior, but not many single cases—
and not even many handfuls of cases—can be relied upon to dramatically alter agency behavior;
certainly not quickly. This is because agencies can engage in a strategy of trench warfare in
which they simply defy the court’s latest holding until another plaintiff seeks judicial review of
another decision.89 Where agencies issue one license at a time, in separate proceedings, plaintiffs
must be prepared to challenge each one in turn, a time consuming and expensive prospect. By
contrast, a successful challenge to an agency rule can have more far-reaching effects.
Perhaps more importantly, most agency decisions, most of the time, go unchallenged.
And of those that are the subject of a lawsuit, most settle. High profile cases in which a federal
appellate court, or the United States Supreme Court, invalidates federal agency action are,
relatively speaking (and despite the impression one gets from casebooks in law school) few and
far between. Beyond this, under the most plaintiff friendly circumstances, legal challenges take
years, cost money, and can be dragged out, all of which buys the agency time to continue its noncompliance.
In the case of FERC, the agency very likely resisted judicial oversight for a combination
of related and reinforcing reasons. Agency officials who had internalized the pro-power culture
and adopted the original pro-power mandate seem genuinely to have believed that environmental
obligations were some other agency’s responsibility. Engineers, in particular, may have resisted
and resented the expertise of the differently trained staff from other agencies; their own internal
environmental staff remained embarrassingly small through the seventies. FERC was likely also
responding to interest group pressure from licensees and applicants who felt that taking account
of the environmental effects of hydropower licensing would slow the licensing process and raise
the costs of hydro-power generation, something the country could ill afford. And of course, any
impetus in the direction of change would have been nipped in the bud by the energy crisis, and
the ensuing legislation encouraging licensing.

88

Robinson interview, supra; Interview with Dinah Bear, Chief Counsel for the CEQ, October, 2003, on file with
author.
89
In these cases, the courts are invalidating a single license and not an agency rule, so they only apply to the instant
case. While it is true that a reviewing court can, in so doing, indicate what is legally required of the agency the next
time around, until the next license is challenged it remains valid.
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4. Reluctant Principals?
To a significant extent then, the reluctant agency is the logical result of reluctant
principals. That is, until ECPA passed, neither Congress nor the executive seemed terribly
interested in forcing FERC to comply with its secondary mandates, and this might have
emboldened FERC to shrug off the only principal pressing for compliance—the courts.90
Sometimes, however, principals are not reluctant so much as they are unclear or
inconsistent. For example, it can be hard to discern precisely what Congress wants of agencies;
Congress is hardly crystal clear in its legislative pronouncements and it is not a monolith when it
comes to overseeing delegated power. As we have argued elsewhere, an agency that in theory
answers to “Congress” really answers to multiple principals within Congress, including the
original enacting majority (which expresses its wishes via statutory language and legislative
history); later oversight committees (which may, acting as a group, have their own priorities);
individual members of oversight committees (whose influence can be separated out from
committee averages); and members-at-large (who may also exert influence).91 Matters become
even more complicated in the case of multiple statutes passed over time by different enacting
majorities, overseen by a variety of committees whose membership changes.
A Congress this fractured is beset by problems of coordination. It may, as a result, send
agencies mixed messages.92 For example, members of oversight committees may not seek to
enforce the terms of a statute passed by an earlier enacting majority. Instead the committee may
advance its own interpretation. But even committee oversight is not stable—average committee
preferences have been shown to change over time.93 Moreover, average committee preferences
tell only part of the story. Individual committee members may pressure agencies to arrive at
outcomes that further their own electoral interests. And of course, members-at-large can
intervene in agency processes as well. 94
When one considers the temporal dimension of the legislative process (which forces
agencies to keep pace with changes in both legislation and committee oversight over time), with
the complexities of a fractured Congress (which forces agencies to respond to multiple messages
from competing committees and members-at-large), it would not be surprising to discover than
an agency receives mixed messages. Inevitably, some statutory mandates will be overseen with
90

Congress was, of course, sending mixed messages during this period, which undoubtedly reflected competing
views among members and committees with divergent interests and priorities. On the one hand, Congress continued
to pass environmental legislation aimed at cleaning up the nation’s air, water and land, and at protecting endangered
species. In almost all of these statutes, Congress included citizen suits to enable private interest groups access to the
federal court. On the other hand, congressional oversight of FERC specifically seemed to be pro-energy.
91
See DeShazo and Freeman, Congressional Competition, supra note 36.
92
Id..
93
See Weingast and Moran, supra note 31.
94
One might think that congressional minorities are brought under control by either the floor or by parties. Of
course this occurs to some extent but there are obstacles to perfect control. Compare Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith
Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 531 (1990)
(discussing theory of perfect control) and DeShazo and Freeman, Congressional Competition, supra note 36
, at note
168 and accompanying text (critiquing theory of imperfect control).
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greater vigor than others. Agencies may feel that the safest course, when faced with new
mandates and conflicting messages, is to stick with its original mission. At least one can imagine
an agency doing so until instructed—decisively—to change.
Executive branch oversight can be equally complicated. In theory, a president’s job is to
execute all the laws equally. In practice, of course, this is impossible. For reasons of ideology
and practicality, administrations always choose among competing priorities. This necessarily
results in under-implementation of some statutory mandates compared to others. And, to the
extent legally permissible, administrations will interpret statutes in line with their political
agendas. There is nothing unusual or untoward about this. One administration may favor
vigorous enforcement of environmental laws even if it slows energy production, or uphold civil
rights even at the expense of national security concerns, while another may do the opposite. An
administration may intentionally allow an agency to ignore some of its obligations if doing so
furthers more important priorities. Conceivably, in some cases, an administration will simply do
nothing in the face of such conflicts. It may prefer not to resolve conflicts between competing
statutory mandates because of the transaction and opportunity costs of doing so. In such
instances, the agency will be left to sort out how to address competing priorities; political
appointees might step in only to resolve the most politically salient matters.
What if an administration were not a reluctant principal, however? Suppose the President
wanted to hold an agency to account for some long ignored mandates. Wouldn’t it be relatively
easy to do so? The answer is yes, presumably, at least for executive agencies, if the issue were at
the top of the President’s agenda. But with less salient matters (and this includes the
overwhelming majority of the federal government’s day to day implementation of statutes)
executive control over executive agencies, like congressional control over delegated power, is
imperfect, and there are opportunity costs to focusing on any one problem over another.
In theory, the President could simply direct an executive agency to comply with all of its
legal obligations.95 But even if the White House could bring to heel the political appointees at the
top of the agency, career staff with longer and greater experience, access to more information
and support from both congressional allies and the press, could frustrate their objectives.96
Moreover, the analysis above applies to executive branch agencies where the President
ostensibly exerts significant top-down control. Attempting to influence independent commissions
like FERC would prove even more challenging.
For different reasons, judicial review is also an imperfect oversight tool. Unlike Congress
and the executive branch, courts deal only reactively and episodically with agency behavior.
Unlike Congress, they cannot oversee agency decision-making on a continuous basis and must
wait for litigants to bring cases to them.97 Whereas the executive and legislative branches can
95

Elena Kagan, Presidental Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
Why would an agency resist executive efforts at control? For the reasons suggested above—because of the
agency’s entrenched sense of mission, or because the agency is under-resourced and/or overtasked already—or
perhaps because congressional oversight and interest group pressure is pushing the agency in the opposite direction.
97
Note exception of structural injunction used in class actions involving civil rights but not available in standard
administrative review cases.
96
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signal both executive and independent agencies in myriad ways, the only tool of oversight at the
disposal of courts is invalidation or remand of agency action, both rather blunt instruments.98
And agencies can simply treat a ruling in one federal Circuit as inapplicable in others, unless and
until the Supreme Court rules on the matter.
There are, in addition, many obstacles to litigation that limit its availability as an effective
oversight tool. As in private law, the transaction costs of public law litigation are sufficiently
high that many meritorious cases may never be brought; litigation is slow and cumbersome so it
can take many years for a lawsuit to have any impact on an agency’s practices; and many
victories in the arena of administrative law are procedural, and therefore somewhat limited, in
the sense that the agency can fairly easily fix its mistake and still achieve its original desired end.
And, as we noted earlier, agencies sometimes simply defy judicial decisions. This is not to say
that courts are entirely, or even mostly, ineffective in overseeing agency behavior, or that
“procedural” victories are not meaningful. The point is simply that judicial review, like
legislative and executive oversight, is an imperfect source of control over the reluctant agency.
In the case of FERC’s licensing program, all of these limitations were in evidence. The
triggers for judicial review were limited until the passage of environmental legislation obligating
FERC to observe numerous procedures and enabling citizen groups to access federal courts more
readily. Moreover, even when environmental groups, tribes and agencies began to aggressively
file suit, the total number of cases was still relatively few.99 Of those that succeeded, the
reviewing courts generally held that FERC had committed procedural blunders rather than
substantive errors that would have made the granting of a license arbitrary or capricious on the
merits. Though FERC’s exclusive authority over licensing was eroding, the full impact of this
prospect would take awhile to settle on the Commission.
In light of this history, what explains the reluctant agency? There are, it seems, a number
of reasons why agencies may stay wed to a primary mandate while ignoring secondary ones.
These include the original statutory mandate, which elevates some goals and enfranchises some
interest groups over others; the agency’s sense of mission, its culture, and the professional
orientation and expertise of agency staff (all of which flow from the original mandate but can
take on a life of their own); the obstacles to coordination and fractured committee structure
within Congress that prevent perfect oversight as mandates multiply; the obstacles to direct
control by an administration over executive but especially independent agencies, which prevent
perfect oversight as mandates multiply; and the inherent limitations of reactive, episodic and
largely procedural judicial review. Presumably, both legislative and executive principals could
overcome some of their control and coordination problems, but only at the expense of high
transaction and opportunity costs. Courts are even more limited in overcoming the limitations of
judicial review. While we cannot say definitively which of these influences has the greatest
effect, it seems that their combination helps to explain how reluctant agencies remain reluctant
over time.

98

Of course, rules may be reviewed prior to enforcement. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (preenforcement review available when matter ripe and waiting until enforcement would cause hardship).
99
Cite collected data on lawsuits.
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III. RELUCTANCE OVERCOME
FERC’s reluctance to comply with its secondary mandates did begin to erode in 1984-85,
just prior to when ECPA was passed. And though we will later argue that passing ECPA made a
significant difference to FERC’s licensing practices, it would be an overstatement to suggest that
ECPA, alone and suddenly, caused FERC to change course. It appears that FERC was “softened
up” for ECPA and already moving in the direction of taking its secondary mandates more
seriously. Why?
The answer lies in the partial victories and accretive progress in the story told above: all
of the determinants of agency behavior began to shift at least somewhat toward pressing FERC
to attend to its environmental mandates, even if no single principal acted forcefully or decisively
on its own. First, as noted earlier, Congress had passed, in the late sixties and early seventies, a
spate of new or significantly amended environmental statutes. Some of these laws imposed
environmentally related obligations specifically on FERC (e.g., the WSRA) while others
generally applied to all federal agencies including FERC (e.g., NEPA). Some of the new
statutory mandates were “procedural” (e.g., to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service over
endangered species or file environmental impact statements) while some were “substantive” in
that they had more potential to restrict FERC’s decision making power (e.g., FERC could not
issue licenses without state certification under the CWA). In at least one statute (the amended
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act),100 Congress specifically tried to boost inter-agency
coordination by requiring FERC to consult with fish and wildlife agencies prior to issuing
licenses, and by demanding that non-developmental values be given “equal consideration” with
power concerns.101
These statutes opened the door to inter-agency lobbying. Even before ECPA was passed,
the resource agencies attempted to influence license applicants in the informal consulting
process, and in many instances formally intervened to try to influence FERC. Most of these laws
also contained citizen suit provisions that enabled environmental groups to access the federal

100

16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1988). The FWCA requires all federal agencies involved with management of natural
resources to consult with federal and state wildlife agencies before authorizing projects and to give “equal
consideration” to wildlife conservation in water development projects.
101
See supra note. The conference report accompanying the legislation emphasizes that “equal consideration” is
necessary so that FERC will give non-developmental concerns “the same level of reflection as it does to power and
other developmental objectives….equal consideration must be viewed as a standard, both procedural and
substantive, that cannot be satisfied by mere consultation or by deferring consideration and imposition of
environmental conditions until after licensing. Protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife, energy
conservation, and the protection of recreational opportunities are a potential cost of doing business for hydropower
projects.” See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 132 Cong. Rec. H 8776 (Sept. 30,
1986). FERC’s most recent handbook on hydropower licensing says that enviroronmental values include, “fish and
wildlife resources, including their spawning grounds and habitat, visual resources, cultural resources, recreational
opportunities, and other aspects of environmental quality” and developmental values include, “power generation,
irrigation, flood control, and water supply.” See Handbook for Hydroelectric Project Licensing and 5 MW
Exemptions from Licensing, FERC, April, 2004 at 1-2.
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courts more readily.102 FERC itself may have ignored or resisted these mandates initially, but in
passing them Congress equipped third parties to hold FERC to account.
In addition, Congress had laid the groundwork for weakening FERC’s exclusive
jurisdiction over the licensing process103 by carving out a right for federal and state resource
agencies to impose mandatory conditions on FERC licenses under certain circumstances. Section
4(e) of the FPA authorized the Secretary of Interior to condition licenses on Indian
reservations;104 section 18 afforded resource agencies the power to require fish passages.105 The
courts ultimately interpreted these powers fairly broadly, cutting back FERC’s exclusive
authority.
Third, the intense pace of licensing and the apparent disregard for environmental
concerns during the “hydro gold rush” led to a backlash. The agency’s behavior was in part a
result of being overwhelmed by applications: its staff and budget were too small to handle the
onslaught.106 In order to manage, the Commission took steps to shorten review times and issue
licenses quickly.107 This, the Commission thought, was what Congress wanted. But in its effort
to deliver results, FERC was careless: exemptions were widely granted in perpetuity with no
restrictions; too many projects were licensed to quickly; the agency engaged in precious little
monitoring; and there was widespread non-compliance with the few conditions that were
imposed.108
Simply put, the agency made some “stupid decisions that enraged a lot of people.”109 For
example, FERC declared that concrete structures less than ten feet in height were simply not
dams, which had the practical effect of exempting many projects from the licensing process
altogether.110 The agency also determined that fish only swim in one direction, an interpretive
move that had the effect of limiting the ability of resource agencies to require dam operators to
install fish passages.111 Both of these decisions would ultimately land FERC in the federal courts,
where it would lose resoundingly.

102

Of course even without citizen suit provisions, litigants could avail themselves of the Administrative Procedure
Act section 10 in order to get standing. This was the route for bringing challenges under NEPA, which contained no
citizen suit provision.
103
FERC believed it had this power because the FPA required it to engage in a comprehensive balancing process,
and because Supreme Court precedent supported FERC’s primacy. See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v.
FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946) (holding that the FPA preempts state imposed conditions on licensing).
104
See 16 U.S.C. §787(e) 1994. Licenses “shall be subject to and contain such conditions shall deem necessary for
the adequate protection and utilization of such resource…”
105
See 16 U.S.C. §
106
“We were used to getting about 5 applications per year, and we were happy to have something to work on! All of
a sudden there were hundreds of applications to deal with, and the staff was teeny. There were about ten
environmental people.” Robinson interview, supra note.
107
O’Connor, supra note at 132.
108
O’Connor, supra note at 131.
109
Robinson interview, supra note.
110
See O’Connor, “supra note at 130 (1993).
111
Need cite.
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It is hard to overstate the effect of this overzealous response.112 The agency’s pell mell
approach to licensing drew the attention of environmental organizations across the country, most
of which had never before looked closely, or comprehensively, at FERC’s licensing practices.113
Up to this point, the Commission’s self-understanding was, as described earlier, rather
imperious, and it had stirred up opposition only episodically and locally. The agency carried this
attitude into the hydro rush period with disastrous consequences. No longer was FERC asserting
absolute power in one isolated instance after another; now it was doing so in the context of a
national program affecting many rivers simultaneously across the country. “People began to sit
up and take notice, and they asked, ‘Who do you think you are?’”114 The hydro rush had finally
brought FERC’s licensing program to national attention.
Suddenly, public interest groups like American Rivers115 and Trout Unlimited116 were
scrutinizing the agency. Up to this point, no organized environmental interest groups had been
committed to monitoring FERC’s hydropower program.117 “Public interest groups had engaged
FERC in episodic siting fights but then they would go away. As a result, FERC Commissioners
never had systematic contact with the groups. The groups that had organized around particular
conflicts had no interest in FERC as an institution. And it was difficult to interest funders in
monitoring FERC. There was no intervenor compensation.”118
In the mid-eighties, everything coalesced: three of the most important cases that FERC
lost, Tulalip Tribes of Wasington v. FERC,119 Yakima Tribes v. FERC120 and Escondido v. La
Jolla,121 were decided in 1984; in that same year and again in 1985, the Senate Energy and
Natural Resources Committee held hearings on FERC’s licensing process; and following the
hearings, Congress required that GAO monitor the licensing program.122 Not surprisingly, the
developments in one arena seemed to influence and reinforce developments in another.
Successful lawsuits lent support to the wildlife agencies in their dealings with FERC, and
provided ammunition for interest groups pressing Congress to act. Of course, all of this provided
momentum for the passage of ECPA in 1986. 123
The most important of the judicial decisions mentioned above, Escondido, interpreted the
mandatory conditioning power in section 4(e) of the FPA to cut back FERC’s asserted authority
112

Robinson Interview, supra note.
Cavanaugh interview, supra note; Robinson interview, supra note.
114
Robinson Interview, supra note.
115
See http://www. www.americanrivers.org.
116
See http://www.tu.org.
117
Robinson interview, supra note
118
Cavanagh interview, supra note.
119
732 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1984).
120
746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.1984) (holding that FERC is obligated under §10(a) to consider “all beneficial public uses”
of waterways and required that consideration to occur prior to issuing a license).
121
467 U.S. 1267 (1984)
122
This history is recounted in Kerwin, supra note at 94
123
See H.R. REP. 99-507 at 2507-8 noting that, even after a raft of major court decisions “coming down on all
phases of the Commission’s hydropower program…for giving inadequate treatment to environmental values….Just
last month, again the Commission was reversed by the courts…for failure to give adequate consideration to fisheries
and failure to prepare an environmental assessment or impact statement.”
113
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over licensing. The Supreme Court required FERC to accept modification conditions deemed
necessary by the Secretary of Interior on public lands and reservations. The Court held that
FERC had no discretion to determine the reasonableness of these modifications: “The fact that in
reality it is the Secretary’s and not the Commission’s judgment to which the court is giving
deference is not surprising since the statute directs the Secretary, and not the Commission, to
decide what conditions are necessary for the adequate protection of the reservation.”124 This dealt
a stunning blow to the agency’s position that it alone had licensing discretion. It forced the
agency to recognize that the mandatory conditioning power accorded other agencies in the Act
would not be read as “advisory.”125
The cumulative effect of this and the other cases in the federal courts was beginning to
take a toll. Robinson recalls that the lawyers in the agency came to the program staff responsible
for licensing and told them, “You’re killing us.”126 A tipping point had been reached. And the
agency began to change.
By 1983, the Commission had already begun to develop a basin-wide approach to
licensing, in which it would consider the cumulative effects of multiple projects, something it
had long resisted.127 In 1984, it issued a Directive to Staff to prepare a plan for this new
methodology, which became known as the “Cluster Impact Assessment Procedure” (CIAP).128
FERC also began to make greater efforts to encourage applicants to consult early in the licensing
process with fish and wildlife agencies, as well as tribes and states, in order to integrate
environmental and recreational considerations on the front end.129 The agency also began to
develop a new policy with regard to NEPA compliance (after years of saying it was not bound by
CEQ policy) though it was not finalized until 1988.130
124

Escondido, supra note at 777.
Robinson interview, supra note “We realized, we were no longer in charge.”
126
Robinson interview, supra note.
127
See O’Connor, supra note at 133-4; Robinson interview, supra note.
128
Id.
129
Kerwin notes that as early as 1982, the agency had issued detailed regulations and guidance documents advising
applicants to consult with fish and wildlife agencies prior to filing an application. Though the agency still left the
consultation burden to applicants, the agency had begun, as Kerwin puts it, to emphasize negotiation and consensus
to a greater extent in the licensing process. See 47 Fed. Reg. 38506. The consultation requirements were elaborate.
For example, applicants first had to contact all appropriate agencies and provide them with detailed maps, designs
and environmental analyses along with streamflow information. At the second stage, the applicant had to perform a
variety of studies in order to determine the impact of the project. The third stage required ongoing service and
consultation with resource agencies regarding exemptions or modifications. The purpose of the rules was to
encourage consultation with a wide variety of agencies early and throughout the licensing process. See s.4.38.
Kerwin suggests that as ECPA was passed, the licensing process had already come to “rely on a strategy of
negotiation between agencies and applicants.” See also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 49 Fed. Reg. 8009 (Mar. 5,
1984) at 8015, emphasizing that process of applicant consultation with fish and wildlife agencies must be more than
opportunities to simply provide the agencies information. “An effort should be made to determine the types of
studies agencies consider necessary, the information they have in hand, their concerns about the environmental
consequences of the proposed project and their ideas about mitigation of adverse impacts or enhancement of
resources. Areas of disagreement between applicants and agencies should be isolated, and an attempt to resolve
conflicts should be made. Applicants should be aware that if they and the agencies cannot resolve their conflicts, the
Commission will give weight to the agencies expertise….”
130
See O’Connor, supra note at 134.
125
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the agency restructured itself. It created a
licensing office headed by the former Director of the Environmental Division, and an Office of
Environmental Compliance headed by environmental experts rather than civil engineers.131
These internal changes represented a “cultural tsunami” says Robinson, a limnologist on the tiny
environmental staff at the time, and now Director of the Office of Energy Projects. “We were
plucked into management of the hydro program and told we were in charge. Hirings of wildlife
biologists, fish biologists and other environmental staff went way up. Before this, we couldn’t
even use terms like ‘instream flow’ and we couldn’t talk about NEPA because the Commission’s
position was that it didn’t apply! In 83-84 there was a tectonic shift.”132
At the same time, Congress had swung into action. The initial impetus for ECPA was not
the environmental aspects of the licensing process, it should be noted, but other features of the
FPA, most importantly the preference for public over private license applicants in the license
renewal process.133 Many licenses were set to expire in the late 1980s and 1990s, and private
utility operators were concerned that the legislative preference for municipalities in the original
licensing process might apply as well to re-licensing. ECPA clarified that municipalities would
retain their preference in original licensing proceedings only.134 However, federal and state
resource agencies, and environmental organizations took advantage of the opportunity to appear
at hearings and criticize FERC’s disappointing record on fish and wildlife considerations.135
Recall that, until just before ECPA was passed, the relevant House and Senate oversight
committees pressed FERC to pursue its historical pro-power orientation, signaling the agency
that it could ignore its environmental obligations with few consequences. Indeed, it fell to other
committees in Congress, namely those with responsibility over environmental statutes (and
indeed to one especially powerful member of the House, John Dingell who had Chaired the
Fisheries and Wildlife subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee) to press
for the statutory amendments in the bargaining over ECPA. This suggests that an intercommittee struggle between pro-environmental committees in Congress and pro-energy
committees was occurring in the background of the statutory drafting.
The House Committee Report accompanying ECPA notes that consideration of nonpower values under both the FPA and applicable environmental laws had historically been “less
than satisfactory;” that environmental considerations had “generally given less weight than
power production;”136 and that the FPA had been implemented with “little regard for the
economically and socially important fishery resources of the nation.”137
131

The agency also added environmental advisors to each regional offices and created a staff unit for public
outreach. See Robinson interview, supra note.
132
Robinson interview, supra note.
133
ECPA clarified that a municipality is not entitled to a preference at relicensing; enumerated the factors the
Commission must consider in acting on relicense applications; and specified the standard the Commission must use
in choosing among competing applications. See Echeverria, supra note.
134
See H.R. REPA. 99-507.
135
See Grimm, supra note at 940.
136
H.R. REP. 99-507 supra at 2504. In his statement in support of the bill, Congressman Dingell said that, “While I
Chaired the Fisheries and Wildlife subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, the Federal
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The Report goes on to note that “despite landmark environmental laws passed in the
intervening years,” the FPA itself had remained largely unchanged. “[A]s presently written, the
Federal Power Act itself does not specifically ensure that hydroelectric development and
operation proceeds in a manner consistent with fish and wildlife values, although other laws,
such as [NEPA, ESA and the FWCA] have supplemented the Federal Power Act to require
FERC to provide greater recognition of these values.”
And though it acknowledged changes at FERC, the Committee clearly felt the agency
was not making sufficient progress. “While recent Commission actions under Chairman
O’Connor demonstrate improvement, the Commission has not always displayed sufficient
concern for the non-power aspects of hydropower development. Moreover, as Commission
members change so too does FERC’s attitude toward these aspects.”138
The Committee seemed intent on integrating the requirements from other statutes directly
into the FPA to eliminate any doubt that these mandates were in fact FERC’s.139
Most importantly, the legislative history evidences a specific congressional intent to
facilitate and strengthen inter-agency lobbying. Even though FERC was diversifying and
promoting its own environmental staff at the time, Congress chose to strengthen the hand of the
resource agencies that it could fairly predict—because of their own statutory missions, cultures,
and track records—would reliably pressure FERC to pursue environmental protection and
wildlife conservation.

Power Commission would devise, with apparent relish, schemes to circumvent or render ineffective the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act.” 133 Cong. Rec H 1996, Monday, April 21, 1986.
137
Id. at 2506.
138
Id. at 2504.
139
See 132 cong rec H 1996. Comments of Rep. Dingell: “Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 44 which
amends the Federal Power Act to resolve a very thorny and contentious issue concerning the relicensing of
hydroelectric power facilities. It is a fair bill. It is a reasonable bill. It is proconsumer. It is pro-environment. Just as
important, it retains the expressed statutory preference for states and municipalities in original licensing, while
making it inapplicable in proceedings following expiration of an existing license…I particularly want to stress the
environmental features of the bill worked out cooperatively with all my colleagues on the committee, but
particularly the bill's chief sponsor, Mr. Shelby, the subcommittee Chairman, Mr. Markey, and the ranking minority
member, Mr. Moorhead….The fish and wildlife and related environmental provisions of this bill are long overdue.
To me, they are the backbone of the bill. As the electric utility industry knows, they are one of the principal reasons
for my supporting the bill with great enthusiasm. For too many years, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
and its predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, treated these important natural resources, including the pristine
waterways to which they depend, with disdain and indifference. These resources have been relegated to a mere
nuisance, rather than treated as a valuable and irreplaceable national treasure. Too often, while I chaired the
Fisheries and Wildlife Subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, the Federal Power
Commission would devise, with apparent relish, schemes to circumvent or render ineffective the fish and wildlife
coordination act. Recently, under former chairman O'connor, FERC showed some indication that this attitude might
be on the wane. But he is gone and now some of the new commissioners seem ready to revert back to the "good old
days." This must not happen. I believe that this bill, along with some vigilant oversight by the Energy and
Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, which I chair, will help to assure that it
does not.”
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The Conference Committee Report specifically adverts to this goal, describing ECPA as
“clearly and unmistakably upgrading the status of recommendations made to FERC by fish and
wildlife agencies such as the National Marine Fisheries Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and the State fish and wildlife agencies made pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act.” ECPA is intended, says the Report, to underscore the need for both FERC
and license applicants to work with these other agencies.140
One way to view ECPA, then, is that it merely clarified and reinforced obligations that
FERC was already required to meet.141 Yet this is not quite right. ECPA created new burdens.
For example, “equal consideration” of power and non-power values per se was not required
under the FPA; the language in section 10(a) merely required the agency, when choosing among
competing applicants, to select the proposal that presented the most “comprehensive plan” for
the waterway. The agency was to consider not only power benefits but also recreation. It took,
however, until the 1960s for courts to being construing section section 10(a) to require FERC to
explicitly consider recreational and environmental values on a par with power concerns. And
while the FWCA had required since 1934 that FERC consult with wildlife agencies, Congress
only added the “equal consideration” language to that statute in 1958. So, while one could say
that FERC had always formally been obligated to consider equally non-power and power values,
and had just ignored that obligation, the more persuasive claim is that this imposition on FERC
was of more recent vintage. ECPA cemented a relatively recent expansion of FERC’s
obligations, one that had occurred thanks to the federal courts.142
Setting aside whether the “equal consideration” feature was in fact new, other changes
created by ECPA were inarguably new: ECPA required that FERC itself, and not just the license
applicants, consult with specific resource agencies; that FERC develop a dispute resolution
process to resolve its disagreements with other agencies; and that the Commission give reasons
for not adhering to their recommendations. As Spence puts it, ECPA raised the transaction costs
140

See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 132 Cong. Rec. H 87666, Tuesday, September
30, 1986. “Under section 10(j), the fish and wildlife conditions FERC imposes for each project must be based, as
required under present law, on recommendations made by these fish and wildlife agencies. To address concerns that
the input from these agencies could be ignored, watered down, or undervalued, the Commission may only reject, in
part or whole, a recommendation of any of these agencies concerning any specific project after attempting to resolve
the difference with the agencies and after publishing a finding (and reasons therefor) that such recommendation is
inconsistent with the purposes and requirements of the Federal Power Act and that the conditions selected by FERC
meet the statutory standard in section 10(j)(1).” Such findings would be subject to judicial challenge under arbitrary
or capricious review. Id. Still, the Report reinforces that the recommendations are not mandatory requirements and
do not dictate a particular result. The amendments are intended to ensure that FERC does not ignore them as it has
so often done in the past.
141
The House Committee Report on ECPA noted that “…the bill does not amend or change the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act, NEPA or other environmental laws. It addresses and clarifies FERC’s procedures and decisionmaking to ensure that those laws are fully met.” See supra note
142
If Congress had merely done this, we might be able to claim that the form of Congress’ intervention was
determinative i.e., that amending the enabling law, as opposed to expressing congressional preferences in
independent environmental statutes. But this comparison is not available to us. We conducted here an “event” study,
which focuses on ECPA and the difference it made, controlling for other possible explanations of FERC’s behavior.
We did not set out to compare alternative methods of congressional attempts to alter FERC’s behavior. Still, we
speculate about this in the hopes that it becomes a fruitful area of research. See infra, note and accompanying text.
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of ignoring the other agencies.143 And ECPA put all of these obligations, new and old, in one
place, front and center in the agency’s own statute, the FPA.
To be clear, prior to ECPA, agencies concerned about non-power values already
participated in FERC’s licensing process through consultation with license applicants and
through intervention in licensing proceedings. Yet, their efforts were routinely thwarted by
FERC. Inter-agency lobbying had accelerated somewhat in the early eighties, but our data show
that ECPA had an important booster effect. The data show that ECPA nevertheless made a
difference to the number of environmental conditions imposed on licenses specifically because it
intensified inter-agency lobbying. We explain our findings below.
IV. EMPIRICAL DATA
A. Summary
Against this history of FERC as a “reluctant agency” we set out to study whether ECPA
made any difference to FERC’s licensing process. Our empirical strategy was to explain the
number of environmental conditions as a function of a variety of influences: interest groups,
legislative oversight,144 and local conditions such as the characteristics of the dam, the local
power market and the local stock of natural resources, which might affect the propensity to
impose environmental conditions.145 Controlling for these and other influences, we wondered
what might explain the rate at which FERC imposes more or fewer environmental conditions per
license. We discovered, to our surprise, that the most likely explanation for the rise in
environmental conditions we observed was inter-agency lobbying.

143

Spence, supra note at.
These principals include a congressional statutory majority that altered FERC’s legislative mandate, the members
on FERC’s oversight committees, and at-large members representing jurisdictions in which FERC is relicensing a
dam.
145
Local conditions can affect the costs and benefits of imposing environmental requirements on dam owners, and
thus should affect the willingness of intervenors and legislative overseers to exert effort to block them, thereby
reducing the chance that the agency will impose them. We focus on factors that affect 1) the social opportunity costs
of the conditions, including the cost of finding alternative power; 2) the profits to dam owners; and 3) the costs of
retrofitting dams. We hypothesize that where the price of replacing power lost due to the imposed conditions is high,
FERC will impose fewer conditions. Similarly, where the price of foregone profits (due to imposed conditions) is
high, FERC will impose fewer conditions. Finally, where the relative cost of retrofitting the dam is higher as a result
of the conditions (e.g., when an older dam must be retrofitted to control flow, in order to protect fish life), FERC
will impose fewer conditions. On the other hand, FERC can be expected to issue relatively more conditions for dams
with physical aspects or modes of operation whose modification will provide larger benefits (i.e., larger and taller
dams with greater storage capacity are likely to negatively impact the local environment relatively more, so
modifications to these dams will have greater environmental benefits than modifications to shorter dams with
smaller storage capacities). Dams operated in a “run-of river” mode (which provides consistent flow to fish stocks),
rather than a “peak” storage mode (which allows dam owners to charge high prices during peak demand but which
can “starve” fish stocks of minimum flows), are already environmentally friendly and will be associated with fewer
conditions. Conversely, the greater the value of the environmental resources that would be protected by the
conditions (i.e., where the dam is located on an “endangered river” or on a river containing endangered species), the
greater the number of conditions FERC will issue.
144
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Our study tracks the number of environmental conditions FERC imposed on the 222
dams the agency relicensed between 1983 and 1998.146 We focus on relicensing because this was
FERC’s primary activity at the time (indeed it will continue to be the agency’s major focus in the
hydropower area for the foreseeable future.147 Approximately 116 projects underwent relicensing
between 2001 and 2005, and another 69 will do so between 2006 and 2010.148) The relicensing
process is especially important when it comes to mitigating environmental harm because older
dams built between the 1930s and 1950s typically included minimal conditions to mitigate
environmental harms; they were licensed before most of the environmental legislation applicable
today was passed and at a time when FERC was focused, as we have pointed out, exclusively on
production values.149 Relicensing these dams without applying environmental conditions would
be enormously destructive for fish and wildlife.150
Our data reveal that the number of environmental conditions rose strikingly following
ECPA’s implementation and the results point to inter- agency lobbying as the explanation.
We base this conclusion on six key findings. First, our data show that, on average, FERC
imposed more that twice the environmental conditions in dam re-licensing proceedings after
1990, a date by which we can be certain that ECPA had been fully implemented. (jumping from
an average of about five to an average of twelve conditions.) Second, our data show that public
resource agencies representing environmental concerns intervened in FERC re-licensing
decisions more frequently than any other groups during the period we studied (both before and

146

These data come from four primary sources: the hydroelectric relicense itself, the hydroelectric relicense docket
sheet, an internal FERC database, the 1990 U.S. Census, and various governmental records on political and river
basin characteristics. The data consist of 222 observations of hydroelectric dam relicenses issued by FERC over the
fifteen-year period.
147
Over our period of study, 1983 to 1998, FERC issued over 2,400 environmental requirements for 222 dams. Over
the next 15 years FERC will issue environmental conditions for over 1,500 dams, locking in a portfolio of power
and non-power benefits for the 30- to 50-year lifetimes of each license. Notably, both the initial licensing and the
relicensing process follow the same procedures, so there should be no difference between the two in terms of how
FERC considers environmental effects. The Supreme Court has held that a relicensing application should be given
the same scrutiny by FERC as an initial license application, with all the attendant requirements and regulation. The
court held that “relicensing…is more akin to an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of a public resource than a
mere continuation of the status quo. Simply because the same resources had been committed in the past does not
make relicensing a phase in a continuous activity. Relicensing involves a new commitment of the resource, which
in this case lasts for a forty-year period.” See Yakima Indian Nation vs. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 746
F. 2d. 466.
148
See Sensiba, supra note at n.7 citing American Rivers, Facts About Hydropower and Dams
(http://www.amrivers.org/facts.html).
149
See Lydia T. Grimm, Comment, Fishery Protection and FERC Hydropower Relicensing under ECPA:
Maintaining a Deadly Status Quo, 20 ENVTL. L. 929 (1990) AT 931.
150
The environmental conditions imposed on dam licensees can help to ameliorate adverse environmental impacts
caused by dams by requiring sufficient in-stream flows for fish migration; limiting the fluctuation of flows that
results from storage and release at peak demand; requiring operators to build fish passage devices and to mitigate
dam impacts on water quality and soil erosion. Conditions might also require operators to provide on-site recreation
or to preserve historical and archaeological resources. However, because retrofitting older dams can be expensive,
and because mitigation measures for environmental and resource protection can interfere with the production value
of these dams, the imposition of environmental conditions remains highly contentious.
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after ECPA was passed).151 This tells us nothing in particular about the effect of ECPA, but it
does tell us that agencies are active players in the decision making processes of sister agencies.
Third, by comparing public agency participation before and after ECPA, we show that
public agency participation increased after the statute was passed, climbing steadily over time.
And after 1990 (again, a date by which the statute can be assumed to be fully operational), the
rates of participation jump even more: the average participation of public intervenors in FERC
licensing proceedings jumped post 1990 by 300 per cent, from an average of 3.2 public
intervenors to an average of 10.5.152 While participation rates for all intervenors increased postECPA, none spiked as much as the public agencies.153
Fourth, this public agency intervention matters. Over the period we studied, public
intervenors had a significant impact on the number of environmental conditions imposed by
FERC: for every additional federal agency that attended a relicensing hearing, FERC imposed an
average of three-quarters of an additional environmental condition on the license; for every
additional state agency, FERC imposed an average of approximately one third of an additional
environmental condition. Fifth, the data show that the magnitude of the influence each of these
public agencies exerted on environmental conditions increased, almost doubling on average after
ECPA was fully implemented. Finally, when the increase in agency intervention is put together
with the increase in the magnitude of their influence, we find that public agencies were
associated with 60 percent of all environmental conditions following the full implementation
ECPA, that is up from about 20 percent in the period prior to ECPA’s full implementation the
majority of the increase in environmental conditions that followed the passage of ECPA.
Our analysis also offers two secondary insights. Controlling for the impact of public and
private intervenors as well as for a wide variety of other possible influences,154 the data also
show that ECPA itself, independent of its impact on inter-agency lobbying, and indepenedent of
any other factor, caused a jump of about three environmental conditions on average. In addition,
our data show that legislative oversight involves several competing principals, some of whom are
associated with significant decreases in environmental conditions, while others cause an increase
in these conditions.
While it is true, as Kerwin points out, that FERC was already increasing the number of
conditions per license in the early eighties, the post-ECPA jump is nevertheless striking. It is
hard not to conclude from the evidence that ECPA made a difference; that it intensified the
underlying inter-agency dynamic. Again, to be clear, our study separates the impact of ECPA
(meaning all the procedural and substantive changes that ECPA represents) from the impact of
151

Indeed, our data show that public agencies comprised 60% of all intervenors in FERC proceedings over this time.
This represents the biggest absolute increase of any types of intervenors in FERC’s licensing decisions.
153
The participation by all intervenors rose from an average of about five to an average of almost sixteen--a tripling
in participation.
154
Our regression controls for a variety of other potential influences on the number of environmental conditions
such as oversight by members of Congress from the district in which the dam is located; oversight by congressional
committees; type and location of dam; and unique features of the river on which the dam is located. Our
expectations about how these factors would affect the number of environmental conditions were largely borne out.
For example, as we expected, dams located on scenic rivers are more likely to receive more conditions.
152
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public agency intervenors. Both are associated with a jump in environmental conditions.
However, since the ECPA’s reforms primarily strengthen the influence of public agencies, we
believe the primary explanation for the increase in environmental conditions is inter-agency
lobbying. 155
Our empirical results highlight a surprisingly important role for inter-agency lobbying in
the agency decision making process. Federal and state agencies not only participated in
relatively large numbers in FERC’s relicensing hearings, but also had the largest empirical
impact on FERC’s decision-making of all the factors we considered. And ECPA appears to have
intensified this impact.
For theories of legislative control, inter-agency lobbying appears to be an important but
overlooked form of control, beyond the traditional ex ante statutory and ex post oversight
instruments. For theories of interest group influence, the effectiveness of lobbying by public
agencies appears to turns conventional wisdom on its head. Normally, we would expect local
firms and market-oriented groups, who bear concentrated costs, to mobilize more effectively
than other groups, such as consumers, who enjoy only diffuse benefits. However, our results
reveal that public agencies, which are more akin to groups representing diffuse interests, are the
most effective intervenors of all.
Below, we explain our methodology and findings in more detail. We conclude by
discussing the way in which the methodological limits of an event study affect the strength of our
inferences from these data and the robustness of our argument.156
B. Public Participation in Relicensing
Before it was reformed significantly in the wake of ECPA, 157 the traditional FERC
relicensing process was lengthy, reactive and adversarial. The process typically began three to
five years prior to the license expiration.158 FERC did not mediate between license applicants

155

To be clear, prior to ECPA, agencies concerned about non-power values already participated in FERC’s licensing
process through consultation with license applicants, and through intervention in licensing proceedings (which
enabled them to challenge licenses in federal court). And prior to ECPA, courts had already (and repeatedly)
admonished the agency to take non-power values more seriously. Finally, prior to ECPA, public support for
environmental values had already been building for nearly two decades, and Congress had responded to that public
sentiment by passing environmental legislation. Indeed, this provided the statutory basis for the judicial
admonishment referred to above. ECPA built on, and intensified, these trends.
156
This discussion will address omitted variable bias, simultaneity/endogeneity bias, and the definition of the
“event” in this analysis as well as other issues.
157
It should be noted that, in recent years, the traditional sequential licensing process (through which applicants first
consult with relevant resource agencies without FERC’s involvement and then file applications with the agency) has
been supplanted by a new, more negotiated process that integrates environmental considerations early. See infra
note, and accompanying text.
158
The FPA authorizes FERC to choose among five options upon application for renewal: the federal government
can take over the project (which has never happened); FERC can issue a new license to the incumbent licensee;
FERC can issue a new license to a new licensee (this has never happened where the incumbent licensee has applied
for renewal); FERC can issue a temporary nonpower license which transfers the project lands to the federal, state or
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and resource agencies, but required that they consult with each other prior to submission of an
application.159After consultation, the applicants would prepare studies and submit the application
to FERC. Only upon receiving it did FERC staff review the studies that were proposed by the
applicant, and process the application. Finally, the Commission would issue the license with
relevant conditions.160
By the early 1980s FERC adopted a liberal intervenor policy,161 allowing any interested
party to file comments and participate in the relicensing process, providing that its interests were
not already represented. As a result, during the period we studied, a wide range of interest
groups participated in FERC’s licensing process.162 These include the dam owner, local utility,
local water-dependent businesses, Indian tribes, recreational and environmental non-profits and
numerous state and federal resource agencies. Table 1 provides examples of the different types
of intervenors.

municipal government (this has never happened); or FERC can accept surrender of the license (which is rare). See
Powell, supra note at 511.
159
“The applicant prepares the proposals, then the agencies, Tribes, and public react….” Powell, supra, note at 414.
160
The process proceeded in seven stages and typically took 3-5 years, but sometimes much longer. At step one, the
dam owner files an application with FERC and FERC provides public notice of the relicense application in the
federal register and specific notice to appropriate resource agencies; at step two, the applicant and agencies engage
in a first-stage consultation; at step three, the applicant prepares studies and a draft application; at step four, the
applicant and resource agencies engage in a second-stage consultation; at step five, the applicant files the application
with FERC; at step six, FERC processes the application and complies with NEPA requirements; finally, FERC
issues the license with terms and conditions. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Hydroelectric Project
Relicensing Handbook, April 1990. The process is also detailed in 18 C.F.R. §16.8.
161
FERC promulgated regulations to revise its intervenor rules. See 18 C.F.R. pt.4 (Regulation 214 in 1982.
162
See Moore et al. There is a between an “official” and an “unofficial” intervenor which we do not recognize in our
dataset. Only official intervenors are entitled to file a lawsuit in the Court of Appeals challenging a final FERC
decision, while unofficial intervenors can (and do) comment, receive information upon request, and participate in
the negotiations. Still, unofficial intervenors have no legal authority to challenge the final outcome of the relicensing
decision. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (a)(3).
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Table 1: Intervenor Descriptions and Examples
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C. Environmental Conditions
Because FERC has only declined to relicense one project out of 222 from 1983-1998, the
primary focus of the relicensing proceedings studied here is the environmental requirements that
FERC imposed in relicensing proceedings. These environmental requirements may be
subdivided into six broad purposes: erosion control; water quality; historical and archaeological;
recreational and aesthetic; resource; and flow. Table 2 provides a sample of various types of
requirements.163
Conditions can be both costly and inconvenient for licensees. Examples range from less
expensive and largely procedural requirements (e.g., that licensees monitor water quality) to
onerous ones that restrict owner decisions in ways that will cut into profits (e.g., the maintenance
of minimum stream flows to support fish populations).
We treat the number of environmental conditions as a measure of FERC’s attentiveness
to its secondary environmental mandates. While we recognize that this is an imperfect
measure—because a greater number of conditions may not always translate into greater
environmental protection—it is nevertheless the best proxy available for measuring FERC’s
willingness to take environmental concerns seriously.164
Table 2
Sample Requirements By Type
Erosion Control Requirements
License
P-298
P-2397

P-2360
P-2535
P-1267
P-2421

Description
File an erosion protection and remediation plan
Licensee shall file with Commission recent geotechnical analysis of
shoreline conditions, for purposes of determining need for remediation of
erosion
Licensee shall file a dust and erosion control plan
Maintain a shoreline buffer of trees
Conduct a five-year channel monitoring study
Plan to establish and maintain a shoreline buffer zone

Flow Requirements
P-2512
P-2512
P-2512
P-1957
P-1773
P-2360

163
164

Operate project in run-of-river mode
Install a streamflow gage to monitor minimum flow releases
Develop a plan to set limits on the maximum rate of change in river flow
Licensee shall act to minimize fluctuations of reservoir surface elevations
Maintain and utilize a guaranteed priority stream flow device to
automatically release minimum flows
Licensee shall release bottom water from the diversion dam whenever
possible

Department of Energy, 1991, 1994, 1996.
See Table A1 of the Appendix for a description of the all of the variables we use in the foregoing analysis.
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Water Quality Requirements
P-96
P-487
P-271
P-405
P-405
P-459

Licensee shall file a plan to minimize the quantity of sediments or other
pollutants resulting from construction, that might enter project waters
Licensee shall conduct a water quality monitoring program
Licensee shall study measures to alleviate coldwater discharges from the
dam
Licensee shall develop a study plan to look at dissolved oxygen and
temperature levels in project reservoir
Licensee shall conduct a study for disposition of river-borne debris
Licensee shall take necessary measures for control of vectors at the project

Resource Requirements
P-120
P-503
P-2520
P-2520
P-18
P-663
P-2468
P-2580
P-460

Licensee shall survey lands for presence of any endangered species
Develop a plan to ensure protection of raptors from electrocution
Install upstream fish passage facilities
Install downstream fish passage facilities
File a plan to monitor the golden eagle nest near the project site
Monitor habitat aquatic species populations in bypassed reach
Licensee shall provide annual monetary contributions for fish losses due to
turbine entrainment mortality
File a plan to monitor existing wetland habitat
File an Estuarine Enhancement Plan

Historical & Archaeological Requirements
P-1413
P-2428
P-1267
P-1889

Consult and cooperate with the State Historic Preservation Officer
File a cultural resources studies and management plan
Manage historic properties
Consult with the SHPO to determine any necessary historic or
archaeological mitigation measures

Recreational & Aesthetic Requirements
License
P-96
p-1889
P-935
P-935
P-1235

P-6032
P-1394
P-2486

Description
Licensee shall submit a plan to minimize any disturbances to the natural,
scenic, historical, and recreational values of the project
Licensee shall consult with agencies in the development of park areas to
provide for optimum public utilization and recreation needs of project area
Licensee shall provide recreational facilities
Licensee shall provide boat access and launching facilities
Licensee shall construct a small boat launch/take out facility and a paved
canoe portage path; consideration shall be given to handicapped in the
recreation facilities
Bury a transmission line, for visual and recreational reasons
Licensee shall fund two access trails
Implement a telephone hotline on daily flows

D. Findings
1. FERC imposed more that twice the environmental conditions in dam re-licensing
proceedings after ECPA had been fully implemented.
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Table 3 presents the average number of environmental conditions included in licenses
each year. We see that before ECPA’s implementation a FERC license had an average of 4.8
conditions, while after ECPA’s implementation this number increased to 12 conditions.165 There
may be many reasons for this increase. There may have been changes over time in the
characteristics of both the rivers and the dams up for relicensing. The implementation of ECPA
may have changed the preferences of FERC. There may also have been changes in the types and
numbers of interest groups that participated in relicensing and changes in the legislative
oversight of FERC.
Table 3
Environmental Conditions per License by Year
Pre-ECPA (1982-1990)
Post-ECPA (1991-1998)
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

4.8
12.0
2.2
4.8
2.3
4.3
6.0
8.0
5.3
4.3
3.7

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

11.3
9.4
8.8
11.1
13.2
13.4
14.1
15.2

2. Public agencies represented the largest number of intervenors.
In Table 5 we present the propensity of organizational types to participate as intervenors.
Perhaps most surprising is the distribution of intervenors across organizational types (see the far
165

Even if one assumes that ECPA was immediately implemented following passage, the upward trend in
environmental conditions is still clearly observable and our results would not change significantly.
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right column of Table 3). The highlighted figure indicates that FERC will face far more public
sector intervenors (60% of the total) than private sector (19%) or non-profit (21%) intervenors.
In fact, the average number of state agencies (3.0) and federal agencies (3.4) participating as
intervenors outnumbered private sector (2.5) and non-profit (2.7) intervenors put together.
Table 5
Interveners by Geographic Scope and Type of Organizationa
Local
State
National
Total
Avg. (row %) Avg. (row %.) Avg. (row %) Avg. (column %)
1.6 (64%)*
0.5 (20%)
0.4 (16%)
2.5 (19%)
Private Sector
0.8 (30%)
0.7 (26%)
1.2 (44%)
2.7 (21%)
Non-profit Sector
1.5 (19%)
3.0 (38%)
3.3 (42%)
7.8 (60%)
Public Sector
3.9 (30%)
4.2 (32%)
4.9 (38%)
13 (100%)
Total
a.

Based on the 222 licenses issued between 1983 and 1998 with an average of 12 intervenors per license.
*Includes dam owner as an intervenor.

Local private sector intervenors (comprising 64% of private sector intervenors) are
significantly more prevalent than state and national private sector intervenors (comprising 20%
and 16 % of all private sector intervenors, respectively). State and national public sector
intervenors are significantly more prevalent (at 38% and 42% of the total public sector
intervenors, respectively) than are local public agencies (comprising only 19% of the public
sector intervenors). We find non-profit intervenors at all three geographical levels; local (30%),
state (26%) and national (44%).
3. ECPA is associated with an increase in the total number of intervenors but the increase
in absolute numbers is, by far, the greatest for public agencies.
Table 5 shows that the average number of intervenors per licensing increased
substantially after ECPA was implemented in 1990. Moreover, the greatest absolute effect was
for public intervenors. Even though there was an upward trend in the data before ECPA was
passed, the post-ECPA jump is quite striking: a 300 percent increase in public agency
participation (from an average of 3.2 to an average of 10.5 participating agencies).
Table 5
Types of Interveners per License by Year

Pre-ECPA 1982-1990
Post-ECPA 1991-1998
Year
1982
1983
1984
1985

Total
4.9
15.6

Public
Agencies
3.2
10.5

NonProfits
0.5
3.3

Private
Sector
1.2
1.9

2.0
16.4
1.7
2.8

1.7
7.2
1.3
1.8

0.0
1.8
0.3
0.8

0.3
7.4
0.0
0.3
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1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

4.3
3.8
4.4
6.0
2.3
10.7
33.2
6.5
11.2
11.5
20.3
14.1
17.4

3.8
3.4
3.7
3.9
2.3
9.3
22.1
5.3
8.1
8.5
9.7
9.5
11.1

[Vol.
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.6
0.0
0.3
5.1
0.8
3.0
2.5
6.5
3.2
5.1

:

0.3
0.0
0.6
1.5
0.3
1.7
6.1
0.5
0.3
0.5
4.2
1.4
1.8

4. Federal and state agencies have the largest overall influence on FERC’s propensity to
issue environmental conditions. The influence of public agencies on environmental conditions
appears to have doubled with the passage of ECPA.
In Table 6, we seek to explain changes in the number of conditions per license as a
function of several factors including dam and river characteristics, intervenor characteristics,
legislative oversight and other regional factors. Model 1 reveals the relative influence of the
different intervenors over the entire study period. Note that, as highlighted in Model 1,
FEDERAL PUBLIC has the largest estimated coefficient (0.78). This means that the presence of
an additional federal agency intervenor is associated with three-quarters of an additional
environmental condition on average. STATE NONPROFIT appear to be the second most
influential intervenor with an estimated coefficient of 0.64, followed by STATE PUBLIC with a
estimated coefficient of 0.37.166 These results are consistent with our expectations that federal
and state agencies support environmental conditions. Federal and state resource agencies have
been the most influential types of intervenors, with federal agencies being about twice as
influential as state agencies.167
Combined with the results in Table 4, we can calculate the combined effect of federal and
state agencies on FERC’s propensity to attach environmental conditions to relicenses. To
calculate the total influence of each type of public agency, we consider the average number of
participants (presented in Table 4) in conjunction with their marginal effect (presented in Table
6). This is captured in the simple calculation below.
166

Not surprisingly, LOCAL PRIVATE and LOCAL NONPROFIT are (-0.54) and (-0.45), respectively. The
presence of an additional intervenor of either of these types is associated with one-half fewer requirements on
average.
167
STATE NONPROFIT and LOCAL NONPROFIT are both statistically significant; yet STATE NONPROFIT is
positively correlated with requirements, while COUNTY NONPROFIT is negatively correlated. This is consistent
with county level non-profit intervenors representing the interests of local communities that bear the cost of higher
energy costs, while state level intervenors represent those consumers who enjoy the upstream, downstream, and the
pure public goods provided by the environmental requirements. Finally, COUNTY_PRIVATE is significant and
negative as expected.
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On average, 3.3 federal agencies and 3 state agencies attend a relicensing hearing (see
Table 4). Thus, the average total effect of federal agencies per license is (3.3 federal agencies ×
.78 of a condition) 2.54 additional environmental conditions. The average total effect of state
agencies per license is (3 state agencies × .33 of a condition) 1.11 additional environmental
conditions. The average total effect of federal and state inter-agency lobbying is (2.54 + 1.11)
3.65 environmental conditions over the entire time period.168
While this analysis shows that federal and state agencies were the most influential types
of intervenors over our entire study period, for our argument the larger question remains: did the
implementation of ECPA substantially increase their influence relative to other intervenor
groups? To explore answers to this question, we examine Model 2 in Table 6. Model 2 enables
us to measure the influence of the major intervenor groups (i.e., public, private and non-profit)
before and after ECPA’s implementation.
Within Model 2, the coefficient on PUBLIC AGENCIES measures the influence of each
agency before the implementation of ECPA. Before ECPA’s implementation, the involvement
of each agency increased the number of conditions by one-third (0.301). This reveals that even
before ECPA’s implementation, public agencies had the largest possible influence on FERC’s
propensity to issue environmental conditions. The variable ECPA*PUBLIC measures the
additional incremental impact of passing and implementing ECPA on the influence of each
agency. The coefficient’s sign (which is positive) and size (which is 0.396) indicate that ECPA’s
implementation meant that each agency exerted additional influence associated with over onethird of a condition. Therefore the total influence of each agency after the implementation of
ECPA was (0.306+0.394=0.700), almost three quarters of a condition. This represents a
doubling of public agencies’ influence as a result of ECPA. No other intervenor group had as
much influence before ECPA was passed and implemented. Nor did any other intervenor group
gain as much influence as did public agencies as result of ECPA.
As mentioned earlier, the addition of more environmental conditions will not necessarily
lead to greater environmental protection; this depends in part on how well the conditions are
designed, and the extent to which they are implemented and enforced. In theory though,
conditions are designed to mitigate the adverse environmental impacts of dams, which is why we
used them as a proxy for FERC’s attention to environmental mandates.169
It is possible, of course, that FERC is simply increasing the number of relatively cheap,
easily performed requirements, while decreasing more costly and environmentally protective
168

For the other intervenors with significant coefficients, their average total group influence is STATE
NONPROFITS (0.70×0.64=) 0.45, LOCAL PRIVATE (1.57×-0.54=) -0.85, and LOCAL NONPROFIT (0.83×0.45=) -0.37.
169
Some conditions may be badly designed; some might be well designed but poorly implemented. Our study does
not measure the effectiveness of the measures adopted but assumes that the number of environmental conditions
imposed on licenses is an appropriate dependent variable if one is concerned about how seriously FERC takes its
environmental obligations. Generally speaking, we think it reasonable to assume that adopting more environmental
mitigation measures will be better for the environment than adopting fewer such conditions.
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ones. For example, minimum flow requirements are among the most expensive because they
deprive dam owners of the ability to store water for sale in periods of peak demand.170 The data
show when flow requirements increase, such as those forcing owners to operate dams in what is
called “Run of River” mode, the number of other conditions fall by more than one.171 Perhaps in
some instances, FERC is doing the reverse: substituting fewer, more costly requirements for a
greater number of inexpensive ones.172 The data do show, however, that both expensive and
inexpensive requirements increase after ECPA’s passage and implementation. Moreover, even if
ECPA did result in a greater number of inexpensive restrictions at the expense of fewer costly
ones, it would not undermine our claim that the imposition of more conditions is a sign of
effective inter-agency lobbying. Nor would it undermine our claim that the lobbying and
resulting conditions can be a means of legislative control over FERC; even inexpensive
conditions provide the basis for agencies and interest groups to oversee and challenge FERC’s
implementation as well as dam owner compliance, if necessary.
5. The incremental influence of public agencies increased after the passage of ECPA.
To appreciate the overall influence of public agencies before and after the
implementation of ECPA we consider the increases in both their participation and their
influence. Before EPCA was implemented an average of 3.2 public agencies participated (Table
5), each having an average influence of 0.301 conditions (Table 6, Model 1). These public
agencies are associated with a total effect of 0.96 conditions out of an average of 4.8 total
conditions (Table 3), or about 20 percent of all conditions. After ECPA’s implementation, an
average of 10.3 public agencies participated (Table 4) with an average influence of 0.700
conditions (Table 6, Model 1). These public agencies were associated with 7.3 conditions out of
a post-ECPA average of 12.0 conditions in total (Table 3), or about 60 percent of all conditions.
This pre- and post-ECPA comparison requires careful interpretation. Our analysis clearly
suggests that the increase in public agency influence is associated with ECPA (Table 6, Model
1); however, we cannot attribute the significant increase in public agencies’ participation (Table
5) solely to the ECPA. Still, even if only one half, or even one quarter, of the increase in
participation is due to ECPA, it would have had a substantial influence by facilitating interagency lobbying.
E. Secondary Findings
5. The passage and implementation of ECPA itself, independent of any other factor,
caused a jump in environmental conditions.

170

A dam operated in “peak mode” releases water in response to demand for irrigation or power. Such draw-downs
can lead to dramatic fluctuation in water levels. Minimum stream flows limit the harm done to downstream fish as a
result of this method of operation.
171
That is, the marginal coefficient is both negative and significant.
172
It makes sense that the imposition of some expensive requirements obviates the need to undertake others (i.e.,
flow requirements that enable fish to swim upstream make other requirements less necessary).
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As reflected in Table 6, ECPA’s passage did have an impact on the number of
environmental conditions. We included in our model a dummy variable, ECPAD, which
indicates whether a project was relicensed after January 1, 1990.173 This variable is positive and
highly significant. The coefficient ranges from 2 to 3, indicating an average increase in
requirements.
To be clear, this result is independent of the effect ECPA had on inter-agency lobbying.
ECPA’s mere passage and implementation causes this jump. We cannot say, however, which
feature of ECPA is responsible for it. As we noted above, the statute included a number of
reforms including: requiring FERC to consult directly with environmental agencies; requiring
FERC to give reasons for not following those agencies’ recommendations regarding conditions;
and specifying that power and non-power values were to receive “equal consideration.” We can
say only that, collectively, these changes caused an increase in environmental conditions. To put
a fine point on it, even if no public agency intervened in a FERC relicensing, ECPA would have
this effect. Moreover, because of our controls, we can say that ECPA would have this effect even
in the absence of legislative oversight.

2. To fully explain FERC’s decision making, we need to track both legislative oversight
and the effect of intervenors.
a. Statutory preferences: ECPA increased the total number of environmental
requirements by an average of 3.0 to 3.5. We discussed this variable above.
b. Oversight committee preference decreased the number of environmental requirements
In the Senate, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources oversees FERC.
Members who self-select onto this committee tend to have a policy interest in energy
development (coal, oil and natural gas) and the regulation or deregulation of energy markets.
173

While the Act was passed in 1986, we choose 1990 to represent a date by which we could be certain that the
Act’s effects would be fully incorporated into a license. We made this decision based on a number of
considerations. First, the relicensing process typically begins three to five years prior to FERC’s approval of the
license. Thus, when ECPA was passed, a number of relicense applications would have been in the pipeline. In an
interview, Mark Robinson, who personally negotiated the first post-ECPA license application, reports that the
agency complied with ECPA virtually instantaneously because FERC was, in response to the barrage of lawsuits in
1983-4, already moving in the direction of greater and earlier consultation with fish and wildlife agencies. Yet, it is
hard to imagine that all of the pending licenses could have been immediately adapted to conform to ECPA’s new
requirements in such a short time. Other commentators have suggested to us that the transition from the pre-ECPA
process to the post-ECPA process took some time. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 1984, requiring license
applicants to consult directly with the resource agencies, was somewhat slow to take effect. Moreover, FERC did
not even issue its own regulations implementing ECPA until 1998 and 1989. See Hydroelectric Relicensing
Regulations Under the Federal Power Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 23756 (May 17, 1989); Regulations Governing Submittal of
Proposed Hydropower License Conditions and Other Matters, 56 Fed. Reg. 23108 (May 8, 1991). While we
recognize that rule promulgation may lag behind internal agency behavior and that some of these regulations
confirmed and clarified practices already adopted by the agency, we are hesitant to suggest that the statute was fully
operational before these rules were promulgated. So, to remove any doubt, we selected 1990. However, regardless of
the year one selects, the trend toward increased environmental conditions post-1986 is consistently positive.
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They also tend to come from coal and oil producing states that are often not supportive of
environmental regulation. As a result, we would expect these members to be, on average, proenergy and anti-environmental protection. Even if that weren’t their orientation, recall that
environmental conditions impose concentrated costs on dam owners, while providing only
diffuse benefits. This by itself may explain why, on average, a committee member would oppose
them.
Consistent with our expectations, our data show that oversight is negatively correlated
with environmental conditions. We use SENATE_COMMITTEE, as a dummy variable
indicating whether at least one of the senators, at the time of relicensing, was a member of the
oversight committee. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant.174 In Table 6,
models 1 and 2, the estimated coefficients range in size from -1.9 to -2.2, suggesting that
oversight committee influence reduces environmental conditions by 18% to 21% on average.175
c. Non-committee member oversight of FERC varied with the extent of their
environmental preferences as measured by LCV scores.
We also isolated the effect of members of Congress who were not on the oversight
committee. These members-at-large can influence FERC through direct or indirect pressure.
They may be compelled to influence FERC when the agency relicenses a dam within their
jurisdiction. In order to measure their influence, and see whether it varied with their
environmental commitments, we needed some indication of member preferences for
environmental protection. As a proxy for how “pro-environment” a member is we used the
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) score.176
As we see in Table 6, the coefficient on this variable is positive and highly significant.
Across models 1 and 2, the size of the estimated coefficient (when significant) ranged from 2.9
to 3.4. Shifting the Senators’ average LCV score from its lowest possible level (0) to its highest
level (1.0) increased the number of environmental conditions by 27% to 32%.177 This suggests
that individual members of Congress do intervene to influence FERC decision making, that their
intervention has an impact, and that the effect of their intervention varies with their commitment
to environmental protection. This result is not surprising. As with the findings on legislative
oversight, this result does help to show that our study controlled for a range of influences on
FERC and that the effect of these influences (e.g., legislative oversight associated with fewer
environmental conditions; member oversight associated with more or fewer conditions
depending on LCV score) conforms to our intuitive expectations.

174

It is significant at the 5% to 10% levels and jointly significant at the 1% level.
This is based on the average number of conditions over the entire study period of 10.4. See Table A1.
176
The League of Conservation Voters score is a rating between 0 and 1 for environmental sensitivity (0 being none,
1 implying extreme environmental sensitivity). Republicans have had lower League of Conservation Voters scores
than Democrats, and Eastern states have had much higher scores than Western states. For the Year 2000 scorecard,
Republicans in the Senate averaged a score of 0.12, while Democrats averaged 0.79. To construct the LCV_SCORE
variable, we averaged the League of Conservation Voters score for the two senators in Congress from the state
within which a project is located in the year that the project was up for relicensing.
177
See supra note
175
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Table 6:
Ordinary Least Squares Model
Explaining the Total Number of Environmental Requirements
Variable
Constant

Model 1
5.644***
(1.865)

Model 2
4.039***
(0.9663)

Private Owner

0.474
(0.609)
-0.734
(0.690)
0.782***(E)
(0.141)
0.368***(E)
(0.139)
0.095(E)
(0.060)
-0.026(E)
(0.250)
0.642**(E)
(0.267)
-0.454*(E)
(0.251)
0.234(E)
(0.389)
0.137(E)
(0.340)
0.548*(E)
(0.291)

0.8992
(0.6197)
-0.8376
(0.6774)

Interest Groups

Multiple Owner
Federal Public
State Public
Local Public
Federal Non-Profit
State Non-Profit
Local Non-Profit
Federal Private
State Private
Local Private
Public Agencies

0.306**
(0.0933)
0.394**
(0.0843)
-0.0211**
(0.113)
0.0310***
(0.132)
-0.125
(0.135)
-0.623
(0.2623)

ECPA* Public
Non Profit
ECPA*Non Profit
Private
ECPA*Private

Legislative
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Principals
ECPAD
LCV Score
Senate Committee
Local
Conditions

Dam Height
kW/103
Electricity Price
kW*Elec. Price/106
Concrete
Dam Year
Run-of-River
NERC-West

NERC-East
River
Characteristics
Endangered River

3.444***(F)
(0.723)
3.426**(F)
(1.452)
-2.237***(F)
(0.740)

2.2503*
(1.024)
2.942**
(1.587)
-1.9246**
(0.792)

0.015***(G)
(0.006)
-0.044***(G)
(0.013)
0.630***(G)
(0.238)
13.8***(G)
(4.46)
1.008*(G)
(0.559)
-0.013(G)
(0.012)
-1.11*(G)
(0.578)
1.510(G)
(1.003)
-0.933(G)
(0.740)

0.0186***
(0.005)
-0.005***
(0.002)
-0.780***
(0.268)
14.34***
(3.32)
1.507*
(0.659)
-0.012
(0.011)
-1.71*
(0.660)
1.980
(1.256)
-0.833
(0.631)

2.312***
(0.685)

2.614***
(0.735)

Adj R2
0.618
0.538
(E) Joint significance test: F(9, 197)=9.62, Prob>F=0.0000***
(F) Joint significance test: F(3, 197)=17.63, Prob>F=0.0000***
(G) Joint significance test: F(9, 197)=6.22, Prob>F=0.0000***
In summary, our study measures a variety of influences on FERC’s licensing decisions,
including legislative oversight and intervention by interest groups. We make further refinements
within each category. For example, we break the oversight variable into statutory directives,
committee oversight and member-at-large influence. And within the category of intervenors, we
isolate the influence of public agencies versus private interest groups so that we are able to
compare the two. (Indeed, we go still further within the public agency category, to separate the
relative influence of federal versus state agencies.) Of the studies we have found of FERC’s
licensing process,178 our study is unique in this regard.179 Our methodology helps to make clear
178

See e.g., Spence, supra note 29,and Kerwin, supra note 28.
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that the only way to fully explain FERC’s propensity to add environmental conditions in a
relicense hearing is to consider all of these influences together.
F. Study Design
Among research methods, our analysis is an event study. We compare agency influence
before and after an event in order to infer the effects that ECPA had on the ability of collateral
agencies to affect the environmental conditions prescribed by FERC. There are several issues
that may attenuate our ability to infer ECPA’s impact on the influence of collateral agencies. We
discuss these below.
1. Missing factors that explain environmental conditions.
Table 6 reflects that we controlled for a variety of factors that might influence the number
of environmental conditions imposed per license. These controls include a host of “local
conditions” that would make the addition of environmental restrictions more or less likely. These
include, among other things, the price of purchasing alternative electricity; the value of foregone
profits to dam owners; the age and physical characteristics of the dam; its location; and the value
of the natural resources it affects. The results confirm most of our expectations with regard to
these influences, and further bolster our confidence in our findings about the influence of public
agencies.180 In addition, we controlled for presidential party over the period studied; whether the
administration is Republican or Democrat makes little difference.
Nevertheless, while we developed as comprehensive a model as possible, there remains a
chance that unobservable factors explain the rise in the number of environmental conditions.
Perhaps a background trend in rising preferences for environmental protection caught the public
agencies and FERC up in its sweep. Our concern is that this omitted factor is positively
correlated with the number or influence of intervening public agencies over time. If so, then our
models’ measurements of the influence of public agencies could be biased upward.
Ideally, we would answer this objection in one of two ways. First, we could include this
omitted variable. Second, we could compare FERC’s decision making with that of another
agency with obligations like FERC’s (i.e., to impose environmental conditions under certain
circumstances) but which was not affected by ECPA.181 We would track the comparison
agency’s decision making pre- and post-1990, as we did with FERC, and see if it too experienced
an increase in pro-environment decisions. If not, we would have even greater confidence that
ECPA was responsible for the rise in environmental conditions.
Though we did not formally construct a comparison case, there does not appear to be a
dramatic and consistent trend, either in Congress or among federal agencies during the period we
179

Cf. Spence, supra note 29, and Kerwin, supra note 28.
See note 89 supra.
181
This statistical approach is called a “difference in difference” approach. It measures the difference in the policy
making between two agencies and then measures over time the difference in that “between-agency difference”
caused by some event.
180
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studied, that would explain the rise in environmental conditions beginning in 1990. Congress did
not generally demonstrate a “pro-environment” bias during the period we studied. While
Congress did pass some statutes enhancing environmental protection (including toughening the
requirements for land deposition of hazardous waste),182 it weakened other statutes. For example,
the 1986 amendments to CERCLA softened the burden of liability for hazardous waste cleanups
by adding an innocent purchaser defense; and the 1987 amendments to the ESA generally
weakened protection of endangered species.183
In 1990, the most significant environmental legislation passed consisted of major
amendments to the Clean Air Act. But these contained a mix of measures, some good for the
environment and some less so (e.g., tightening pollution control requirements in the dirtiest areas
of the country, but also extending deadlines for compliance) along with some measures that were
new experiments (e.g., the acid rain trading program). On the face of it, this legislation would
have been more likely to lead to a drop in EPA enforcement actions rather than a jump, because
states in violation of the old deadlines for compliance would now have a reprieve.184 So while it
is true that the total amount of environmentally protective legislation and regulation has risen
dramatically over the last forty years, during the period we studied there was no dramatic
increase. Instead there were periods of advancement and retrenchment. Thus, FERC’s changed
behavior after 1990 does not seem to follow from a clear and consistent signaling by Congress
that environmental protection mattered.
Similarly, there seems not to be a general, powerful trend among environmental agencies
during this period to more vigorously enforce environmental regulations. Indeed, as noted
earlier, throughout the 1980s, the Reagan administration cut the budgets of the environmental
and natural resource agencies. And the appointment of Ann Gorsuch as EPA Administrator in
President Reagan’s first administration resulted in systematic de-regulation and a retrenchment
in enforcement efforts. Indeed, under her tenure, referrals from the EPA to the Department of
Justice dropped by half.185 In 1990, under President George H.W. Bush, the budgets of the
resource agencies did not dramatically increase.186
To be clear, there may be a measurable upward trend in “pro-environment” attitudes
among the public over the last forty years.187 Surely a growing environmental awareness
182

See, e.g., Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 69916991(i).
183
In 1978, Congress added language to §4 of the ESA (the “No Jeopardy” provision), making it harder to meet the
test for determining that an agency-supported project would jeopardize the continued existence of a species (which
the Act prohibits). Congress also amended the statute to create a committee of high level government appointees
with the authority to exempt certain projects from the section 7 “no jeopardy” prohibition if the actions meet certain
criteria. In 1986, Congress passed SARA to amend CERCLA and make a third party defense available to innocent
purchasers of contaminated property if they meet certain criteria. See §107(b)(3) and §101(35)(b).
184
Moreover, the more stringent permit requirements imposed in non-attainment zones would take some time to
implement, and then some time to violate, so any spike in enforcement actions related to these would not be
expected to occur for some time to come.
185
See supra note at.
186
See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (1990).
187
See, e.g., Riley E. Dunlap, Trends in Public Opinion Toward Environmental Issues: 1965-1990, in AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTALISM (Dunlap and Angela G. Mertig, eds., 1992).
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prompted new environmental legislation. Still, we are dubious about the claim that such a
general and incremental trend fully explains the post-1990 jump in FERC’s willingness to
impose environmental conditions on hydropower licenses.
2. An outside process simultaneously affects the influence of public agency participation
and conditions issued by FERC.
Another, somewhat technical, concern is what is called simultaneity or endogeneity
bias.
Conceptually, the concern is that some causal process simultaneously affects both the
influence of intervenors and the number of environmental conditions that FERC issues. If this is
true, our estimates of the influence of intervenors may be biased in Table 6. We address this
concern by directly testing for the exogeneity (or conversely the edogeneity) of the intervenor
variable. See Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix for details. We can reject the hypothesis that
the intervenor variable is endogenous. Nonetheless we acknowledge that this is still a valid
concern largely because tests of exogeneity/endogeneity are relatively weak. Still, even if it
partially affects our results, we it should not undermine our ultimate claim that ECPA intensified
inter-agency lobbying.
188

3. An expansive definition of the event.
We concede that ECPA does capture what might be described as a background trend in
the direction of greater environmental protection. Without a growing demand for environmental
protection, it is hard to imagine Representative Dingell or any other member of Congress
pressing for ECPA in the first place; the electoral rewards would have been too few. As
described above, momentum for this legislation built over time, in response to growing
frustration with FERC’s disregard for its secondary mandates, a frustration that would not have
arisen in the absence of a growing demand for environmental protection. And as we recounted,
this momentum was reflected in judicial decisions, legislation, and pressure from both
environmental interest groups and environmental agencies.
Yet, as we have already argued, ECPA was more than epiphenomenal. It made FERC
more vulnerable to the influence of collateral agencies by, among other things, requiring an
explanation from FERC for departing from other agencies’ recommendations. The post-ECPA
jump in environmental conditions is too striking, and the post-ECPA role of intervenors too
powerful, to conclude otherwise. So even if ECPA depends upon, and in part reflects,
background trends, this does not detract from our finding that ECPA made a difference. In
particular, it does not undermine either of our two key claims: that inter-agency lobbying can be
a mechanism of legislative control and, relatedly, that Congress can encourage this lobbying by
altering the interest group market.

188

In the models of Table 6, this is the concern the intervenor variable is correlated with the error term of the model,
leading to inconsistent (e.g., biased) estimates of the influence of intervenors on environmental conditions.
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V. IMPLICATIONS
A. Lateral Legislative Control
Conceptually, our analysis extends both legislative control and interest group theories by
broadening the purview of each, and highlighting their overlapping influences. First, we explain
our contribution to the literature on legislative control, which explores Congress’ ability to
control the discretion it delegates to administrative agencies. Traditionally, this literature focuses
on ex ante statutory requirements that limit agency discretion, and ex post oversight that can
correct the agency when it deviates from congressional preferences. 189 Into this mix we offer a
new source of control: collateral agencies. Our case study suggests that Congress specifically
amended the FPA to strengthen the role of public agencies in FERC’s decision making process,
and that this was an effective strategy for altering FERC’s behavior.
Certainly, it is not new to suggest that Congress may try to control agency discretion with
a combination of structural and procedural legislative requirements. McCubbins, Noll and
Weingast190 originated this thesis some time ago, and others have since refined it.191 Indeed,
Spence has applied this approach specifically to FERC, evaluating the effectiveness of
congressional efforts to control FERC’s licensing decisions via procedural requirements in
environmental statutes.192 And beyond ex ante mechanisms such as these, scholars have already
proposed that Congress might enlist third parties in ex post oversight of agency discretion. The
most famous example is McCubbins and Schwartz’ theory that Congress can equip interest
groups to pull “fire alarms” to alert Congress to agency misbehavior.193 Yet to our knowledge,
scholars have not explored the prospect that Congress might rely specifically on inter-agency
lobbying as a mechanism of control.
189

See McCubbins and Schwartz, Police Patrols, supra note 32
; Bendor et. al., 1985; McCubbins et. al., supra note
31; Aberbach, 1990 supra note 31.
190
See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (hereafter Administrative Procedures); Matthew D. McCubbins,
Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. Rev. 431 (1989).
191
See e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); John A. Ferejohn, The Structure of Agency Decision Processes, in CONGRESS:
STRUCTURE AND POLICY (Matthew McCubbins & Terry Sullivan, ed., 1987). McNollgast originally proposed that
Congress can structure agency decision making to lock in deals made in legislative bargaining. See McNollgast,
Administrative Procedures, supra note. Other scholars have contested this account, noting that procedures afford
even members of the losing coalition opportunities to challenge implementation at the administrative stage. See e.g.,
Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive and Critical Stories of Legal
Development, 6 J. L. & ORG. 267 (1990). See also Jerry L. Mashaw, GREED CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE (1997).
192
See e.g., Spence, supra note. Spence’s study covers licensing decisions between 1960 and 1990. He argues that
environmental statutes such as WSRA, the CWA and NEPA, along with PURPA and ECPA, exemplify efforts at
procedural control. Based on his own empirical study, Spence concludes that FERC is somewhat resistant to
political control. Our study, by contrast, makes the specific point that Congress may try to control agency decision
making by strengthening other agencies to intervene in its process. Spence’s conclusions about ECPA’s
effectiveness are not ideal for analyzing the effect of ECPA because the study ends in 1990, the year that we use as a
baseline for the statute’s full implementation.
193
See McCubbins and Schwartz, Police Patrols, supra note 32.
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Why would Congress rely on lateral legislative control? In theory, this should not be
necessary because secondary mandates ought to bind the agency. But as we have shown, a
failure of all relevant principals to enforce these secondary mandates led the agency to ignore
them. Congress has some alternatives to relying on collateral agencies, however. It could, for
example, take the task upon itself. Congress could determine the environmental conditions that
ought to be imposed on dams of a particular age, with particular characteristics, sited in
particular locations, without relying on collateral agencies at all. Yet, deputizing collateral
agencies allows Congress to avoid making such time-intensive and potentially controversial
determinations. And presumably this strategy has an added benefit: it gives members of
oversight and appropriations committees considerable leeway to influence the inter-agency
process during implementation, enabling members, down the road, to intervene on behalf of local
constituents in particular instances.194
Collateral agencies are attractive instruments of control because they have unique
expertise that both Congress and the lead agency may lack. Generalist members of Congress
cannot be expected to fully appreciate the environmental impacts of hydropower projects, and to
develop mitigation strategies. Taking this level of detail upon themselves would be very costly in
terms of both staff and member time. Yet forcing the reluctant agency to develop that expertise
internally could also be costly, and duplicative of expertise that lies elsewhere in the government.
The best strategy for internalizing fish and wildlife considerations into the agency’s
licensing process under these circumstances, then, is to rely on outside agencies, like USFWS,
USFS, and USNMFS, whose statutory mandates already require them to be environmental
experts, and whose success in some measure depends upon their ability to prevent other agencies
from frustrating their regulatory and management efforts. For example, the USFWS could not
hope to protect endangered species as required by the ESA, if FERC continued to license
hydropower with little concern for the devastating impact on anadromous fish runs. Neither
could the Army Corps of Engineers enforce the WSRA without ensuring that FERC did not
license a dam on an especially scenic river. Similarly, state environmental agencies could not
ensure their own compliance with water quality standards under the CWA, without the authority
to decline certification for hydropower licenses that would result in additional pollutants entering
state waters. These agencies are already motivated to act on behalf of the interests that Congress
wishes to strengthen. They are the natural candidates to enlist in lateral oversight.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, relying on the lead agency itself to change
could be risky. In our example, FERC had an internal culture that was resistant to environmental
concerns, and a relative lack of professional expertise in the area. Even if Congress and the
courts demanded it, change might be slow and difficult. Relying on collateral agencies provides
something of an insurance policy to Congress in such circumstances. While FERC had, as we
noted, hired additional environmental staff beginning in the late 1970s, and while existing
environmental staff were moving into powerful management positions in the agency, there was
reason to doubt whether the changes would take root.
194

See DeShazo and Freeman, Congressional Competition, supra note 36.
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Collateral agencies that have consistently pressed for environmental concerns might also
help to reinforce these developments at FERC. Indeed, there might be profitable synergies to be
had among the professional staff in the different agencies. For example, FERC biologists tend to
see fish and wildlife protection through a hydropower prism; they have heightened expertise
about how to mitigate the impact of dams. The biologists in wildlife agencies may lack
specialized expertise about hydropower, but their general knowledge about species and habitat
might exceed that of the FERC experts.195 Combining the different expertise distributed among
the agencies could lead to more effective strategies for mitigation. Presumably, moreover,
developing working relationships with professionals in other agencies, especially those with
similar disciplinary training, could help to reinforce FERC’s culture shift.
One might argue, however, that in deputizing collateral agencies, Congress is merely
enfranchising the interest groups that tend to lobby those agencies (e.g., the environmental
groups that lobby USFWS). This is certainly possible. Yet the extent to which one believes this
depends on the extent to which one believes that agencies are so dominated by the interests that
lobby them that they are effectively “captured”—and this remains a contentious issue in political
science. Moreover, presumably Congress could enfranchise these private interest groups directly
if it were so inclined. We think it more likely that Congress chooses collateral agencies because
of their expertise, and their predictable preferences. Congress can rely on these agencies to press
for their historical interests, which in our case was environmental protection. Moreover, their
own oversight committees can ensure that they do.
This adds another reason why Congress might choose to rely on collateral agencies: it
helps to empower their oversight committees vis a vis the oversight committees with power to
oversee FERC. Why is this relevant? The struggle over how much attention FERC should pay to
environmental concerns can be viewed as an inter-committee struggle in Congress, as we
mentioned earlier. Members serving on committees that oversee the environmental and resource
management agencies are likely to have different preferences than those who serve on the
committees with oversight over energy. When Congress gives a larger role in FERC
decisionmaking to the environmental agencies, it is readjusting power within Congress itself.
B. The Mode of Congressional Intervention
Our study made us wonder whether the form of congressional intervention matters when
it comes to the reluctant agency. In this case, Congress elected to strengthen collateral agencies,
and to do so specifically by amending the FPA itself. In doing so, Congress transformed an
195

“There are two levels of expertise when dealing with energy infrastructure: the local biologists and the FERC
people. The local biologists know where the trout are. They know their damn trout! But the expertise of the wildlife
biologist that works at FERC is different because everything they do goes through prism of hydropower project. So
the FERC biologist knows the best mitigation for inundating these kinds of lands or what have you—they integrate
the wildlife concern with the engineering issues. The local guys are focused on their species and the many things
that affect the health of their species. FERC staff are focused on the engineering and ecological aspects of
hydropower. The ESA guy is worried about the bull trout, but it’s being affected by 500 different actions, like the
new car wash, the new road, and irrigation. But FERC knows hydropower mitigation.” Robertson Interview, supra
note .
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inter-statute conflict between FERC’s competing mandates (i.e., its mandate to license power
pursuant to the FPA and its mandate to protect the environment pursuant to a host of
environmental statutes) into an intra-statute one, by amending the agency’s enabling law. At
least in some circumstances, such a strategy might be optimal.
Our data do not speak directly to this issue, but we flag it as an interesting question for
future research. We expect that most political scientists would say that form should not matter;
what matters is whether Congress intends to make FERC change. Yet, as we pointed out, the
legislative history of ECPA reveals how important it was for members to amend the FPA
itself.196 Our thoughts on this are necessarily preliminary, and secondary to our main point about
the potential power of lateral legislative control but we think it worth asking: is it possible that
statutes of general application may, for one reason or another, be taken less seriously than
specific amendments to the agency’s own enabling law? Quite apart from oversight, is it easier
as a cultural matter for agency officials to ignore obligations that they believe to not be their
responsibility?197 It seems plausible that political appointees, agency lawyers and career staff
might no longer be able to ignore mandates when they are unavoidably built into the statute they
interpret and implement every day. Yet without extensive interviewing of agency officials, or an
empirical test, we cannot answer this.
In our example, one might argue that Congress could have accomplished the same result
by simply shifting its oversight priorities. Once the Senate Energy and Commerce Committee
came to see the light about environmental considerations, it could have signaled FERC that the
agency ought to be more sensitive to the suggestions of the resource agencies. Congress could,
through aggressive oversight, have forced FERC to change its ways. Yet, amending the FPA,
rather than relying on oversight alone, has its advantages. It locks in the new congressional
preferences, and limits the flexibility that subsequent oversight committees and members-atlarge to influence the agency subsequently. Should a future oversight committee direct the
196

See House Report on ECPA (House Report No. 99-507, March 25, 1986, U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496) states that the bill
“clarifies and improves the Commission’s licensing process in assuring adequate environmental
protections….Specific provisions of the Federal Power Act are amended to ensure that hydroelectric development,
management and operation will only be carried out in a manner consistent with the protection, mitigation of damage
to, and enhancement of fish and wildlife (as now generally required by the Act under sections 10, 18, and 30) by
making them specifically an integral part of the Commission’s licensing, exemption, and permitting process. These
non-development purposes will be given ‘equitable treatment’ with the development purposes of the Act (at 2497
emphasis added).” This implies that the Commission already had these obligations but that Congress was now
making them more central to the Commission’s mission.
197
Consider NEPA, which imposes on all federal agencies an obligation to file an environmental impact statement
for major federal projects significantly affecting the environment; or the ESA, which requires all federal agencies to
consult with DOI or DOC over whether projects they support will jeopardize the survival of endangered species.
While these mandates apply to FERC as they do all other agencies, they arise in the context of statutes that are
otherwise irrelevant to FERC and not viewed as part of its domain. NEPA is the responsibility of the Council on
Environmental Quality (in the Executive Office of the President), which promulgates regulations governing the
statute’s implementation and the ESA is the shared responsibility of the DOI (for terrestrial species) and the DOC
(for marine species). Can amending an agency’s enabling law spur or accelerate a cultural shift in the agency? Does
it help the agency to internalize a conflict that it had previously been able to externalize (e.g., the understanding that
environmental mandates are the responsibility of environmental agencies, whereas the FPA’s energy related
mandate is FERC’s responsibility)?
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agency to act in a manner that runs directly counter to the now clear statutory mandate, that
member runs the risk that the agency will (at the behest of its own political appointees and legal
counsel) resist, or that even if the agency complies, the decision will be reversed upon judicial
review. This is especially likely if the legislation enables third parties to sue to enforce the new
mandates. Courts are reluctant to read congressional preferences into oversight behavior, because
it is unreliable and not formalized into law but they are accustomed to reading statutes, and feel
quite comfortable policing agency compliance with statutory mandates. Amending the FPA,
therefore, indirectly empowered courts to oversee FERC’s licensing process even more
closely.198
B. Interest Group Theory
The implications of our analysis for the literature on interest group competition are
equally important. Interest group theory has focused primarily on explaining the reasons why
some interest groups become more powerful than others in the legislative and administrative
process. The classic analysis is that interest groups facing the prospect of concentrated benefits
and diffuse costs will prevail over those that stand to gain only diffuse benefits; the latter groups
have difficulties organizing because there are incentives to free-ride.199 Yet our results show
something unexpected: public agencies can be the most frequent and effective intervenors in an
administrative process. And our analysis suggests that, just as Congress can intervene in the
interest group market to enable private groups to pull fire alarms, Congress can intervene to
augment the influence of public agencies.
Congress can do this with varying amounts of intensity. ECPA did not introduce
collateral agencies into FERC’s licensing process for the first time. Congress had already
empowered these agencies to some extent through a variety of statutory mechanisms, including
the longstanding “equal consideration” language in the FWCA; the general environmental
impact statement requirement in NEPA; and the consultation requirements in WSRA, HCPA and
ESA. The natural resource and management agencies did take advantage of these provisions as
much as they could, intervening in FERC proceedings and joining lawsuits, as we described
earlier. But for years, they were only marginally effective in convincing FERC to impose
environmental conditions. Congress went much further in strengthening their hand when it
passed ECPA. Beyond requiring “equal consideration” for non-power values in the FPA itself,
the statute specifically named the resource agencies that were entitled to impose conditions, and
it created a default presumption that their recommendations would be followed unless FERC
could explain (presumably to a court’s satisfaction) why not.200 ECPA also mandates a dispute
198

Indeed, our data show that legislative oversight during the period studied, even after ECPA, was associated with
a drop in environmental conditions. See coefficient in Table_. So there was certainly not unanimity in Congress over
the need to enforce environmental mandates more vigorously. The key oversight committee remained, on average,
pro-power. As noted above, the driving force behind the environmental mandates in ECPA was Representative
Dingell, the Chair of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Senate Committee on Energy and
Commerce (and notably, the former Chair of the Fisheries and Wildlife subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee). The price for his support of ECPA’s other provisions was the adoption of the environmental
amendments.
199
MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE (1965).
200
16 U.S.C § 803(j)(2).
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resolution process to replace the rather autocratic licensing process that FERC until that point
had used.201
It stands to reason that Congress can also intervene to weaken collateral agencies that it
might have empowered at an earlier time. In fact, the energy bill currently pending in Congress
contains a provision that would re-weight the balance in FERC proceedings toward greater
FERC discretion.202 Some in Congress apparently feel that the pendulum has swung too far in the
direction of the fish and wildlife agencies.203
This is in part a response to the federal courts, which have helped to solidify, and even
extend, the power of the resource agencies to condition FERC licenses. The most important case
in this regard is PUD No. 1 v. Washington,204 in which the Supreme Court held that FERC
licenses are subject to state certification for compliance with state water quality standards
pursuant to §401 of the CWA. This section of the CWA requires states to provide water quality
certification prior to a federal license being issued for any activity that may result in a discharge
of pollutants into intrastate navigable waters.205 As a result of this conditioning power, a state
may impose minimum flow requirements on license applicants. The PUD decision reinforces the
Escondido case discussed earlier, in which the Court made clear that it would take the mandatory
conditioning power of collateral agencies seriously.206 This shows that courts, and not just
Congress, can strengthen inter-agency lobbying, though their ability to do so is much more
limited; it depends on the existence of legislation (like the CWA in the PUD case; or section 18
of the FPA in Escondido) that gives collateral agencies a role in the first place.
Finally, we note that our finding the public agencies can dominate the interest group
market represents a potential challenge to public choice theory. If public agencies are effective at
influencing one another, and if Congress can intervene to make the lobbying agencies even more
effective, perhaps these agencies will give voice to a set of interests that might balance or
neutralize the influence of private (usually well-financed and industry dominated), groups.
Traditional public choice theory would predict that private groups representing concentrated
costs and benefits would prevail in settings like those we described. Yet such predictions might
need to be modified to account for the impact of public agencies.
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Id.
Cite as H.R.6, 10_th Cong. (2005).
203
FERC’s process has changed substantially over time. See 1990 Handbook on Hydropower Licensing and
compare to 2004 handbook. There is much more consultation occurring much earlier now, involving many federal
and state agencies. See 2004 Handbook at 2-6 for a list of agencies that applicants must consult, including NMFS,
USFWS, NPS, USEPA, federal agencies administering any US lands used or occupied by the hydropower project;
the state agency with responsibility over fish and wildlife; state historic preservation officer; and Indian tribes. The
process has become multi-lateral and has evolved considerably from the original bilateral “applicant-FERC”
relationship in which intervenors were viewed primarily as irritants. Ultimately, all of this consultation may result in
fewer formal interventions because agencies may come to feel less of a need to formally participate in licensing
hearings. At some point, we may see a rise in environmental conditions but a drop in agency intervention , which
might be evidence that FERC has internalized a consultative and negotiated approach to licensing.
204
511 U.S. 700 (1994)
205
See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003).
206
See Escondido, supra note at.
202
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D. Inter-Agency Lobbying as Policy Mediation
Our study sheds light on a dynamic that is widespread, but relatively invisible. Interagency lobbying pervades the regulatory process, yet much of it is necessarily informal. The
extent of this lobbying, its quality and effectiveness, may be hard to measure. Whether on agency
succeeds in influencing another likely depends as much on cultural patterns and practices across
agencies, and on personal relationships among counterparts, as it does on formal policies that
attempt to structure such disputes. Indeed a great deal of inter-agency process is likely ad hoc,
uncoordinated and fairly low-level. Only a small subset of inter-agency conflicts will wind up
with one agency formally intervening in another’s licensing or rulemaking process.
Inter-agency conflict seems, on first glance, to be dominated by the executive rather than
the legislative branch. Most conflicts among executive agencies, one expects, will be managed
by the president and his staff, who can resolve them informally—by signaling to political
appointees that they should overcome their disagreements—or more formally, by simply taking
the relevant decisions out of their hands. Of course, most conflicts will never reach this level,
and will be resolved instead by staff within the agencies, by the lawyers in their respective
Counsel’s offices, 207 or by political appointees exercising discretion. (Conflicts between
executive and independent agencies may be especially challenging for the president, since his
ability to control the independent agencies is significantly less.)
The most important player in coordinating agency action across multiple executive
agencies may be the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in OMB, which
annually receives the regulatory agendas of the federal executive agencies208 and which often
exerts pressure on them to adapt their plans to the Presidents’ political priorities.209 For a subset
of environmental and resource management issues that involve compliance with NEPA, the
Council on Environmental Quality plays an important and statutorily prescribed role mediating
inter-agency disputes.210 A number of Executive Orders address inter-agency conflicts as well.211
The point here is that we know relatively little about inter-agency decision making
because much of it is invisible. And what we do know assumes that it is mostly a problem of
coordination that must be handled by the executive branch. But our argument suggests that the
inter-agency process is more than a problem that generates conflicts for the executive branch to
207

John Leshy, former Solicitor at DoI in the Clinton administration, commented to us that he spent a great deal of
his time mediating inter-agency conflicts. Comments made at Environmental Law Conference, Harvard Law School,
November 2003.
208
OIRA compiles the regulatory agendas from all federal entities that have regulations under development or
review into the semi-annual Unified Agenda as part of its implementation of Executive Order 12866. See Regulatory
Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (October 4, 1993).
209
See comments of former OIRA official, The Future of Rulemaking, American University Center for
Rulemaking, March 16, 2005.
210
The CEQ has, in the past, issued reports on the need for greater inter-agency cooperation, especially for
managing large-scale multiple-agency efforts to manage natrual resources like watersheds but the report has been
ignored. See CEQ Report.
211
Cite relevant EOs.
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solve. It can, in our view, be a productive system of policy mediation, in which agencies
introduce to other agencies a set of interests that they may otherwise ignore, or treat only lightly,
even when those interests are intended by statute to be part of that agency’s decision making
process. Thus, we think of inter-agency lobbying not, as some might, in perjorative terms, but as
a mechanism for broadening the scope of the agency decisionmaking process.
Consider the extent to which FERC’s licensing process has been transformed. Some
commentators reported to us that FERC no longer exercises final decision making power over
licenses in any real sense; it has all but yielded its authority to the USFS, USFWS and state
resource agencies, all of which now have mandatory conditioning power.212 The agency has
significantly revised its approach to licensing, creating an “Integrated Licensing Process” in
which license conditions are explicitly negotiated among agencies and stakeholders, and an
“Alternative Licensing” option for speedier resolution of conflicts.213 As Robinson put it, FERC
no longer acts the part of the imperial agency. Instead, it runs a “distributed authority” licensing
program. Indeed, on some projects, seven different entities have mandatory conditioning
power.214
Although there is a growing literature in political science on inter-branch lobbying (e.g.,
between the White House and Congress) we are not aware of significant academic commentary
on agency-agency lobbying (whether between executive branch agencies or between them and
independent agencies, as in our example). And while OMB’s oversight of Executive Orders
requiring cost benefit analysis in rulemaking has been studied and critiqued extensively, the topic
of inter-agency coordination more generally strikes us as under-explored. Here we have argued
that Congress can be a stimulant to inter-agency lobbying when it serves Congress’ need for
controlling agency discretion. This suggests that Congress may have a significant impact on
inter-agency process, a possibility that may be underappreciated. Among other things, Congress’
use of lateral legislative control may have important separation of powers implications, as
discussed below.
E. Separation of Powers
Lateral legislative control may have implications for the separation of powers. When
Congress relies on lateral legislative control, we have argued, it can strengthen the hand of some
agencies vis a vis others. Congress may rely on this strategy as part of an effort to discipline a
reluctant agency, as it did in our example. But in trying to exercise control in this way, Congress
may also yield significant power to the president. On the one hand, this should not be surprising.
All delegations of authority to executive agencies yield some control to the President, who
oversees those agencies through political appointees. Where conflicts arise among agencies, or
where they lobby each other, the president retains the power to step in and arbitrate disputes.

212

Interview with Mark Quern, November 2004, on file with author.
In the “integrated licensing process” the applicant’s pre-filing consultation process with resource agencies occurs
concurrently with FERC’s NEPA scoping analysis. In the integrated process, Commission staff involvement begins
in the pre-filing stage. See 2004 Handbook, supra.
214
Robinson Interview, supra.
213
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Congress may not like the outcome in any particular case, but this is the risk Congress always
takes when it delegates power.
Yet lateral legislative control may raise unique problems where the empowered collateral
agencies are executive and the agency made vulnerable to their influence is independent. In this
case, Congress may yield even greater power to the executive branch than it normally would.
The president may be able to step in to arbitrate conflicts, and effectively determine outcomes, in
the independent agencies, which are traditionally not under presidential control. In our example,
the president can influence how the fish and wildlife agencies behave in the FERC licensing
process. This suggests that there could be separation of powers implications to lateral legislative
control that do not attend the other instruments of control that Congress uses to oversee agency
decision making.
Of course, if Congress finds that it has ceded too much power to the executive branch to
arbitrate disputes among executive and independent agencies, Congress can simply amend the
statute and take the power back. Congress can, as we have pointed out, disempower collateral
agencies just as easily as it empowers them. Perhaps not, however. Once the resource agencies
become embedded in the FERC licensing process, and once cultural practices have changed (as
Robinson suggested they have), it may be hard to shift the lead agency back. And though in our
example, Congress gave every indication of acting intentionally (to make FERC’s more
vulnerable to executive branch agencies and state agencies), we are concerned that Congress may
not fully realize the larger, systematic consequences of lateral legislative control. Congress may
not intend to give the President the authority to arbitrate inter-agency disputes.
F. Statutory Interpretation
Our argument may suggest a new rationale for deference to agency decisionmaking:
courts should be more inclined to defer when the lead agency has negotiated with other affected
agencies and there is consensus among them. Alternatively, in cases of inter-agency conflict over
statutory meaning, courts should defer to the agency that Congress has chosen as the expert for
purposes of that decisionmaking process, even if it is a collateral agency and not the lead agency
implementing the relevant statute. While both of these suggestions are controversial, they are
certainly worth considering. Yet they only emerge as possibilities once one appreciates the
dynamic of inter-agency lobbying.
Traditionally, when an agency like FERC is charged with multiple mandates (e.g.,
hydropower licensing and protection of fish and wildlife), and chooses to prioritize some over
others, scholars and courts treat the agency’s decision as a routine problem of statutory
interpretation. The agency’s resolution of any trade-offs would normally be reviewed under the
Chevron215 test for agency interpretations of law, or the arbitrary or capricious test for agency
decisions based on policy or fact,216 both of which are essentially reasonableness tests. If an
agency ignores a clear statutory mandate, and the mandate is “procedural,” the court simply
215
216

Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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ensures that the implementing agency observed the appropriate procedures, regardless of its
ultimate decision. If the mandate is substantive, however, the court must wrestle with the balance
the agency struck between competing substantive concerns.217 Regardless, from this perspective,
the fact that the agency has multiple mandates is of no great consequence. It simply raises
familiar questions about how courts should treat an agency’s exercise of its discretion.
This traditional understanding of judicial review assumes that for most decisions most of
the time, the only agency of concern is the lead agency charged with implementing a relevant
statute. To the extent that agencies lobby each other, and to the extent that they negotiate
outcomes, judicial review tends to ignore it. We think, however, that the inter-agency dynamic
ought to affect judicial attitudes toward the decisions under review. Shouldn’t it strengthen the
case for deference that the ultimate agency decision is a product of consensus? Or is it possible
that judges will look askance at such “deals” because they will think that agencies may have
negotiated their way to a compromise that the statute does not authorize?
And what should happen, as often did with FERC, when collateral agencies disagree with
the lead agency’s decision? Shouldn’t this affect the reviewing court’s judgment about the
reasonableness of the lead agency’s action? And when push comes to shove, which agency is
entitled to Chevron deference? On the few occasions when courts have encountered this
problem, they have given deference to the lead agency charged with implementing the statute,
which in our case would be FERC. But should they do so, if Congress has specifically intervened
to strengthen the role of collateral agencies over at least some aspects of decisionmaking? While
we cannot resolve these questions here, we flag them as interesting topics for future research.

VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have identified a new form of control upon which Congress might rely
to convince “reluctant” agencies to change their ways: lateral legislative control or, alternatively,
inter-agency lobbying. Congress did not invent inter-agency lobbying; in fact it occurs all the
time. But Congress can intervene to strengthen the hand of some agencies to affect the
decisionmaking of others, and in so doing can ensure that the lead agency takes account of
considerations that it might otherwise ignore.
In our example, we showed how FERC, an agency that had historically ignored a suite of
environmental mandates, was brought to heel to a significant extent by collateral federal fish and
wildlife agencies, and by state agencies willing to intervene in FERC’s licensing process. The
ability of these agencies to influence FERC was helped along over time by the federal courts,
which effectively granted them “conditioning” power over FERC licenses, and, as we showed
with our empirical data, by ECPA, which Congress passed in 1986 in part to intensify this interagency lobbying. The result, our data revealed, was more intervention by public agencies in
FERC licensing, which resulted in many more environmental conditions imposed on the licenses
217

For example, a reviewing court may have to resolve how OSHA should balance the need to ensure that workers
suffer no “material impairment” from exposure to toxics in the workplace, with the tempering instruction that the
agency do so “to the extent feasible.” See API v. OSHA (The Benzene case).
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FERC re-issued in the ensuing years, together with a much stronger, stable, and more structured
role for collateral agencies in the licensing process. Hydropower licensing at FERC, it is fair to
say, has now been transformed from a top-down process dominated by a single imperial agency,
to a negotiated process in which other agencies have emerged as the most powerful players
among all the stakeholders.
Once one peels back the skin of administrative decision making, one finds not lone
agencies making isolated decisions in a cocoon of bureaucratic insularity, but collections of
agencies intervening in each other’s decisionmaking processes, sometimes formally and
sometimes less so. This image of the administrative state is quite different—and much more
dynamic—than the traditional view. It has implications not only for theories of legislative
control, which we have emphasized here, but for our thinking about interest group theory, the
separation of powers and statutory interpretation as well. This Article, merely scratches the
surface of the complicated world of inter-agency process, which we hope becomes a focus of
research in both political science and administrative law.
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Appendix
Table 1A
Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
Total Requirements

Number of environmental requirements issued per license

Interest Group Characteristics
Private Owner
=1 if the ownership of the project is a private utility, = 0 if private non-utility, municipal
ownership, industrial, or cooperative ownership
Multiple Owner
= 1if the owner of the project also owns other projects under relicensing, or whether they
are simply a single project owner, = 0 otherwise
Intervenor Groups
Total number of intervenor groups in a project relicense
Federal Public
Number of federal public intervenor groups in a project relicense
State Public
Number of state public intervenor groups in a project relicense
Local Public
Number of local public intervenor groups in a project relicense
Federal Non-Profit
Number of federal non-profit intervenor groups in a project relicense
State Non-Profit
Number of state non-profit intervenor groups in a project relicense
Local Non-Profit
Number of local non-profit intervenor groups in a project relicense
Federal Private
Number of federal private intervenor groups in a project relicense
State Private
Number of state private intervenor groups in a project relicense
Local Private
Number of local private intervenor groups in a project relicense
Legislative Principals
ECPAD
LCV Score
Senate Committee

Local Conditions
Dam Height
kW
Electricity Price

Concrete
Dam Year
Run-of-River
NERC-West
NERC-East
NY Office
CH Office
SF Office
PO Office
River Miles
Gross Storage/103
Plant Factor %
Recreation Use
River Characteristics

= 1 if a project applied for a relicense after the Electric Consumer Power Act
Amendments went into effect (January 2, 1990) , = 0 otherwise
The average LCV score for the two senators representing the state that the project is
located in, in the year the project applied for a relicense
=1 if either senator of the state in which the project is located was on the congressional
committee which oversees FERC, the year the project applied for a relicense, = 0
otherwise

Dam height in feet above the streambed of the tallest dam in the project
KW capacity generation of the project, divided by 103
Average annual price of industrial electricity in the state the project was
relicensed, for the year the project applied for a relicense (CPI deflated, base year
1970)
= 1if the dam(s) in the project were made
of concrete, = 0 if earthfill, rockfill,
timbercrib, or other
Year (measured by the last two digits, so higher numbers imply younger
dams)
the oldest reservoir involved in the project was put into operation
=1 if the plant operation is run-of-river, =0 if storage, gravity diversion, or reservoir only
= 1 if the project is located in a Western NERC region , = 0 otherwise
= 1 if the project is located in an Eastern NERC region, = 0 otherwise
= 1 if the project is licensed in the New York FERC office, = 0 otherwise
= 1 if the project is licensed in the Chicago FERC office, = 0 otherwise
= 1 if the project is licensed in the San Francisco FERC office, = 0 otherwise
= 1 if the project is licensed in the Portland FERC office, = 0 otherwise
Total river miles of all the dams (creating their respective reservoirs)
A
t-site maximum storage capacity in acre- feet divided by 103
Percentage of time at which the plant is operating at optimal capacity
= 1 if the intended use of the project includes recreation, = 0 otherwise
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=1 if the river of the project (within its state) is either an official Wild and Scenic River,
or is listed on American Rivers’ Most Endangered Rivers list, = 0 otherwise
A count variable for the number of federally listed endangered species for all counties in
the project area

Sociodemographic Variables*
The total population of the county in which the project is located, divided by 103
Population/103
% Age 0-24
The percent of the total population of the county in which the project is located aged 0-24
% Age >75
The percent of the total population of the county in which the project is located over age
75
% Bach. Degree
The percent of the total population of the county in which the project is located holding a
bachelors degree
The median income of the county in which the project is located, divided by 103
Median Income/103
% Below Poverty
The percent of the total population of the county in which the project is located below the
poverty line
Housing Units
The total number of housing units in the county in which the project is located
The total civilian labor force of the county in which the project is located, divided by 103
Labor Force/103
3
Unemployed/10 The total number of unemployed in the civilian labor force
of the county in which the project is located, divided by 103
Total Farms
The total number of agricultural farms in the county in which the project is located
Manf. Earnings
Manufacturing earnings in the county in which the project is located, measured in billions
of dollars
Gov. Revenue
Local government revenue of the county in which the project is located, measured in
millions of dollars
*information taken from the 1988 and 1994 County and City Data Books – 1988 used for project license
applications before 1990 and 1994 used for those after, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/ccdb/
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Table A2
Variable Summary Statistics
Dependent
Variable

Variable
Total

Mean
10.468

Std. Dev.
5.712

Min.
0

Max.
28

Interest Group
Characteristics

Private Owner
Multiple Owner
Intervenor Groups
Federal Public
State Public
Local Public
Federal Non-Profit
State Non-Profit
Local Non-Profit
Federal Private
State Private
Local Private

0.64
0.77
12.041
3.338
2.982
1.536
1.149
0.707
0.829
0.401
0.527
0.572

0.481
0.421
18.649
2.513
2.451
9.129
1.726
1.525
2.55
1.279
1.371
2.201

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
227
14
14
134
10
11
29
10
11
18

Legislative
Principals

ECPAD
LCV Score
Senate Committee

0.653
0.628
0.275

0.477
0.242
0.447

0
0
0

1
0.97
1

Local
Conditions

Dam Height
kW
Electricity Price
Concrete
Dam Year
Run-of River
NERC-West
NERC-East
NY Office
CH Office
SF Office
PO Office
River Miles
Gross Storage/103
Plant Factor %
Recreation Use
Endangered River
Endangered Species

50.171
21.629
5.172
0.568
24.698
0.64
0.189
0.523
0.347
0.356
0.099
0.077
902.869
92.162
54.527
0.55
0.18
3.748

66.156
66.519
1.515
0.497
22.325
0.481
0.393
0.501
0.477
0.48
0.299
0.267
2001.965
418.596
26.069
0.499
0.385
4.416

0
0
2.0223
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

661
650.25
9.23
1
99
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
19994
4959
308
1
1
33

Population/103
%Age 0-24
%Age>75
%Bach. Degree
Median Income/103
%Below Poverty
Housing Units
Labor Force/103
Unemployed/103
Total Farms
Manf. Earnings/103
Gov. Revenue

142.185
34.622
5.724
14.065
25.031
9.324
54812
69.113
4.594
743.721
192.086
89616.85

569.275
9.185
2.083
5.086
8.387
2.659
196485.3
280.502
18.684
753.714
612.989
233052.9

4.887
0
0
6.5
10.973
2.4
1400
1.661
94
0
0.2
4.2

8295
56.5
12.1
34
51.716
18
2855578
4095
273
5911
5035.309
1610700

River
Characteristics
Sociodemographic
Variables
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Possible Endogeneity of Intervenors
Unobservable factors may affect both intervenor involvement and the requirements
issued, leading to concerns about endogeneity. To mitigate this we develop as comprehensive an
empirical model as possible. Nonetheless we explore the presence of endogenieity by
instrumenting for the presence of intervenors and then test directly for the endogeneity. In Table
A3, we present the first stage equation that predicts the presence of intervenors. Explanatory
variables in this model include socio-demographic characteristics that should affect the behavior
of local and state level intervenors as well as several characteristics of the dam and its
surroundings. In Table A4, Model 1 presents the base specification, while Model 2 is the same
specification except that we instrument for the intervenor variable. A MacKinnon-WuHausman test finds that the endogeneity of intervenor participation is not significant at the 5%
level, F(1, 204)=3.06 Prob>F=0.0816.

Table A3
First Stage Poisson Model
Dep Var: Total Number of Intervenor Groups Per Project
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error
Constant

2.343***

0.308

Population/106
%Age 0-24
%Age >75
% Bachelor’s Degree
Median Income/106
% Below Poverty
Housing Units/106
Labor Force/106
Unemployed/103
Total Farms/103
Total Manufacturing
Earnings/106
Total Local
Government Revenue/106

-4.960
0.012***
0.039**
-0.029***
-4.040
-0.075***
-8.660
6.860
0.140***
-0.102**
0.397***

3.170
0.004
0.019
0.007
9.250
0.015
5.640
5.510
0.019
0.045
0.132

-0.547*

0.307

Sociodemographic
Variables(A)
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(B)

Dam Height/102
kW/106
Electricity Price
kW*Electricity Price/106
Concrete
Run-of-River
NY Office
CH Office
SF Office
PO Office
River Miles/103
Gross Storage/106
Plant Factor %
Recreation Use Dummy
Endangered River
Endangered Species
Multiple Owner
ECPAD
(A) Joint significance test: Chi2(12)=131.73,
(B) Joint significance test: Chi2(18)=800.93,
Pseudo R2=0.3665

0.220***
-6.220***
-0.100***
2.480***
0.300***
-0.211***
0.717***
-0.051
0.032
0.490***
0.041***
-0.275***
-0.004***
0.180***
0.534***
0.016*
0.177***
0.695***

Prob> Chi2=0.0000***
Prob> Chi2=0.0000***
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0.048
0.849
0.026
0.275
0.054
0.058
0.099
0.092
0.144
0.120
0.013
0.066
0.001
0.051
0.058
0.009
0.054
0.156
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Table A4: OLS Models 1-3
Dependent Variable – Total Requirements

Interest Group
Characteristics

Variable
Constant

Model 1
4.789**
(1.984)

Model 2-IV
4.973**
(1.996)

Model 3
5.644***
(1.865)

Private Owner

0.958
(0.661)
-0.971
(0.749)
0.047***
(0.165)

1.231*
(0.677)
-1.141
(0.763)
0.143**
(0.056)

0.474
(0.609)
-0.734
(0.690)

Multiple Owner
Intervenor Groups

0.782***(E)
(0.141)
0.368***(E)
(0.139)
0.095(E)
(0.060)
-0.026(E)
(0.250)
0.642**(E)
(0.267)
-0.454*(E)
(0.251)
0.234(E)
(0.389)
0.137(E)
(0.340)
-0.548*(E)
(0.291)

Federal Public
State Public
Local Public
Federal Non-Profit
State Non-Profit
Local Non-Profit
Federal Private
State Private
Local Private
Legislative
Principals

ECPAD
LCV Score
Senate Committee

Local
Conditions

Dam Height
kW/103
Electricity Price
kW*Elec. Price/106
Concrete
Dam Year
Run-of-River
NERC-West

5.453***(A)
(0.666)
5.75***(A)
(1.626)
-1.372*(A)
(0.824)

4.613***(C)
(0.796)
5.038***(C)
(1.645)
-1.618**(C)
(0.82)

3.444***(F)
(0.723)
3.426**(F)
(1.452)
-2.237***(F)
(0.740)

0.014**(B)
(0.07)
-0.05***(B)
(0.014)
-0.683***(B)
(0.262)
17***(B)
(4.65)
1.823***(B)
(0.61)
-0.014(B)
(0.013)
-1.226*(B)
(0.656)
2.134*(B)

0.0128*(D)
(0.007)
-0.038**(D)
(0.015)
-0.586**(D)
(0.262)
11.497**(D)
(5.432)
1.503**(D)
(0.655)
-0.012(D)
(0.013)
-1.176*(D)
(0.665)
1.981*(D)

0.015***(G)
(0.006)
-0.044***(G)
(0.013)
-0.630***(G)
(0.238)
13.8***(G)
(4.46)
1.008* (G)
(0.559)
-0.013(G)
(0.012)
-1.11*(G)
(0.578)
1.510(G)

- 68 -

:

2005]

PUBLIC AGENCIES AS LOBBYISTS

NERC-East
River
Characteristics

Endangered River
Adj R2
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
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(1.112)
0.089(B)
(0.816)
2.787***
(0.761)

(1.120)
-0.370(D)
(0.834)
2.659***
(0.782)

(1.003)
-0.933(G)
(0.740)
2.312***
(0.685)

0.491

0.487

0.618

Joint significance test:
Joint significance test:
Joint significance test:
Joint significance test:
Joint significance test:
Joint significance test:
Joint significance test:

F(3, 205)=34.06,
F(9, 205)=5.96,
F(3, 205)=18.88
F(9, 205)=3.56,
F(9, 197)=9.62,
F(3, 197)=17.63,
F(9, 197)=6.22,

69

Prob>F=0.0000***
Prob>F=0.0000***
Prob>F=0.0000***
Prob>F=0.0004***
Prob>F=0.0000***
Prob>F=0.0000***
Prob>F=0.0000***

